Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality of Pasig
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Municipality of Pasig sought to expropriate a 51-square meter portion of a 1,791-square meter property owned by Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco, and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho, to be used as an access road connecting E. R. Santos Street to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid. The municipality enacted an ordinance authorizing the expropriation. The property owners rejected the municipality's offer to purchase. Procedural History: The municipality filed an expropriation complaint. The property was subsequently sold to Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI), which intervened in the case. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the municipality's right to expropriate and issued a writ of possession. JILCSFI argued that the expropriation was not for public benefit and that the municipality failed to comply with legal requirements. The RTC ruled in favor of the municipality. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, finding substantial compliance with the offer requirement and upholding the public necessity. JILCSFI's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: JILCSFI filed a petition for review, raising issues on whether the municipality complied with the requirement of a valid and definite offer, whether its property intended for public purposes could be expropriated, and whether the requisites for an easement of right-of-way were dispensed with.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Municipality of Pasig complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint. Whether the petitioner's property, which is already intended to be used for public purposes, may still be expropriated by the respondent. Whether the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, and ordered the RTC to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to its refiling. The Court found that the respondent failed to prove it made a valid and definite offer to all co-owners of the property prior to filing the expropriation complaint, a mandatory requirement under Section 19 of the Local Government Code.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent complied with the requirement of a valid and definite offer: The Court held that the respondent failed to prove that it made a written, definite, and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road to all co-owners before filing the complaint. The photocopy of the letter from Engr. Jose Reyes to only one co-owner, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, was not admitted in evidence by the RTC and, even if considered, was merely an invitation to a conference to discuss the project and price, not a definite offer. Furthermore, the messenger's testimony regarding the receipt of the letter was unreliable as he did not personally see the signature being affixed and did not know the recipient. The annotation of the notice of lis pendens was also not a substitute for the required offer, as it was made after the complaint was filed and serves a different purpose. The declaration in the ordinance that property owners were notified was based on the erroneous premise of the letter's receipt and lacked competent evidence. The respondent's contention of implied admission by the Ching Cuancos was also rejected, as their answer contained a sufficient denial for want of knowledge. On the issue of whether the petitioner's property intended for public purposes may be expropriated: The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that its property, intended for a school building and church, could not be expropriated. The Court reiterated the broad concept of "public use" as encompassing whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare, citing Manosca v. Court of Appeals. The primary objective of the expropriation, which was to provide an access road for the benefit of the community, satisfied the requirement of public use, even if the petitioner's intended use was also for public benefit. On the issue of whether the requisites for an easement of right-of-way may be dispensed with: The Court clarified that the respondent, in exercising its power of eminent domain for the construction of a road, is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. The grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken, provided it is for public good and there is a genuine necessity, and the determination is not capricious. The Court found that there was a demonstrated necessity for the road, as testified by residents and the Fire Marshall, and that the proposed road was the most convenient access. However, the Court noted that the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove that the specific portion of the petitioner's property was the shortest and most suitable access road, and that the trial court's finding based on an ocular inspection, which the petitioner was not notified of, had no probative weight due to a violation of due process.
Main Doctrine
A local government unit must strictly comply with the requirement of making a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated before filing a complaint, and such offer must be rejected by the owner. Failure to prove compliance with this mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the expropriation complaint.