Land Bank v. Planta
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Faustino B. Tobia, the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land in Viga, Angadanan, Isabela, voluntarily offered to sell the property to the Government under Republic Act No. 6657. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) determined the valuation at P1,145,075.41. Tobia rejected this offer, deeming it too low. Consequently, summary administrative proceedings were initiated before the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to determine just compensation. Procedural History: The Provincial Adjudicator, in a Decision dated November 14, 2000, set aside the LBP's valuation and fixed the just compensation at P250,000.00 per hectare. The LBP's motion for reconsideration was denied. Despite the LBP filing a petition for judicial determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the Provincial Adjudicator issued a Writ of Execution on June 27, 2001, to enforce the November 14, 2000 decision. The LBP's subsequent motion for reconsideration of the writ was also denied, with the Adjudicator opining that the right to elevate the valuation to the SAC was reserved to the landowner. The Petition: The Land Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) seeking to reverse the CA's Resolution which dismissed its petition for certiorari. The CA had dismissed the petition, ruling that certiorari was the wrong remedy and that a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure was the appropriate recourse. The LBP argued that a writ of execution is not a final order and thus not appealable under Rule 43, and that certiorari was the proper remedy under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, especially given the circumstances and the pendency of the SAC case. The LBP also contended that the CA erred in dismissing the petition outright before it was even filed, despite a timely motion for extension.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner LBP; and whether certiorari is the proper remedy to assail a writ of execution when no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available. Whether a writ of execution issued by the Provincial Adjudicator is a final order or resolution that can be appealed under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Whether the fifteen-day period to file a petition for certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 is extendible.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the petition for certiorari, and directed the appellate court to conduct further proceedings thereon.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari as a remedy: The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari. The appellate court reasoned that since LBP was assailing the writ of execution, its recourse should have been a petition for review under Rule 43. However, the Court clarified that Rule 43 does not apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because it is not a "final order" within the contemplation of that rule. A writ of execution is merely a process to enforce a final order or judgment and is generally not appealable. Certiorari, on the other hand, lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was applicable at the time, expressly provided that decisions on land valuation and preliminary determination of just compensation were not appealable to the Board but were to be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts. Therefore, at the time of filing the petition for certiorari with the CA, the remedy of appeal was not available to LBP, making certiorari the proper recourse. A writ of execution is merely a process to enforce a final order or judgment and is generally not appealable. Rule 43 does not apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because it is not a "final order" within the contemplation of that rule. On the timeliness of the petition for certiorari: The Court also found that the outright dismissal of the petition by the CA was precipitately made. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari even before it was filed, based on its motion for extension of time. The Court reiterated the principle that the CA should have reserved judgment until it had actually received the petition, especially since the motion for extension was filed seasonably. Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 states that any decision, order, award, or ruling of the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari within fifteen days from receipt of copy thereof. While this provision prevails as a substantive law for agrarian disputes, the Court held that the fifteen-day period is extendible, but such extension shall not extend the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, LBP received the order denying its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2001, and filed its motion for extension on August 30, 2001, which was within the fifteen-day period. Therefore, the CA should have acted on the motion for extension instead of dismissing the petition outright.
Main Doctrine
A writ of execution is not a final order or resolution and is generally not appealable; thus, certiorari is the proper remedy to assail a writ of execution when no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available. The fifteen-day period to file a petition for certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 is extendible, but not beyond the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.