Honoridez v. Mahinay
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of a mortgage deed and damages, seeking to prevent the foreclosure of a parcel of land. They alleged mortgaging the land to Jocelyn "Joy" Sorensen (Sorensen) on October 27, 1994, with an exorbitant interest rate of 5% per month. In an amended complaint, they claimed the land was earlier mortgaged to Felimon Suarez (Suarez) on November 9, 1993, requiring them to execute a deed of sale instead. Sorensen allegedly helped redeem the property and paid taxes, after which petitioners executed the mortgage in her favor. Procedural History: Atty. Makilito Mahinay (Mahinay) filed a motion to intervene, claiming a preferential right to buy the lot based on a compromise agreement in a prior case (Civil Case No. CEB-11086). He had previously filed an action for specific performance (Civil Case No. CEB-16335) against petitioners and Suarez, which was decided in his favor, ruling that the contract with Suarez was a sale and ordering Suarez to convey the lot to Mahinay. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory on February 8, 2001. Petitioners and Sorensen opposed Mahinay's intervention, arguing Suarez had not become the owner. Mahinay then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Petitioners filed three motions: to defer judgment on the pleadings, for consolidation, and for leave to file a third-party complaint against Suarez. They claimed they redeemed the lot from Suarez before the decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335, rendering it moot and academic, and that Suarez could not have sold the lot to Mahinay. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied these motions, finding the parties bound by the final decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335 and that their attempt to recharacterize the transaction with Suarez was an effort to reopen a decided issue. The RTC also held that the alleged redemption should have been raised in Civil Case No. CEB-16335. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the RTC's order denying their three motions. They argued the trial court erred in not allowing the third-party complaint, not consolidating the cases, and not granting their motion for reconsideration. They maintained the deed of sale with Suarez was a mortgage and that they had redeemed the lot, rendering the decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335 functus officio.
Issue(s)
Whether the RTC erred in denying petitioners' motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Felimon Suarez, and whether the petitioners' choice of remedy (Rule 45) was proper to assail an interlocutory order. Whether the RTC erred in denying petitioners' motion for consolidation of Civil Case No. CEB-23653 with Civil Case No. CEB-16335, considering the finality of the latter. Whether the RTC erred in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, and whether the attempt to recharacterize the transaction with Suarez as a mortgage constitutes an attempt to reopen a final and executory judgment.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy, the nature of the order, and the third-party complaint: The Supreme Court held that petitioners erred in their choice of remedy by filing a petition for review under Rule 45 to assail an interlocutory order. A petition for review under Rule 45 is proper only for questions of law and to assail final orders or judgments, not interlocutory ones. The RTC's order denying the petitioners' three motions did not rule on the merits of Civil Case No. CEB-23653, thus it was interlocutory. Moreover, even if treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it should have been filed with the Court of Appeals first. The Court also found no substantial question of law presented regarding the third-party complaint, as the factual issues should have been raised in Civil Case No. CEB-16335. On the consolidation of cases: The RTC correctly denied the motion for consolidation because Civil Case No. CEB-16335 had already attained finality and executory status. Under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, only pending actions involving a common question of law or fact may be consolidated. Re-litigating a final and executory judgment in a new proceeding would virtually impeach its correctness, which is contrary to public policy and the principle of immutability of judgments. On the reopening of a final and executory judgment and the motion for reconsideration: The Court found that petitioners' attempt to recharacterize their transaction with Suarez as a mortgage and to claim redemption was an effort to reopen Civil Case No. CEB-16335, a case that had already become final and executory. The decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and had an entry of judgment. Public policy and the doctrine of finality of judgment dictate that once a judgment becomes final, it is immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified or reopened, even to correct perceived errors of fact or law. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was therefore proper.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail an interlocutory order. Furthermore, a final and executory judgment cannot be reopened or relitigated in a subsequent proceeding, as public policy abhors such an eventuality and the doctrine of finality of judgment dictates that once a judgment becomes final, it is immutable and unalterable.