People v. Soberano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In November 2000, Salvador "Bubby" Dacer, a public relations practitioner, and his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, were abducted in Manila. Their remains were later discovered incinerated in Indang, Cavite, and were identified as victims of strangulation. An Information was filed charging several individuals, including SPO4 Marino Soberano, SPO3 Mauro Torres, and SPO3 Jose Escalante, with double murder. Procedural History: Following the filing of the original Information and an Amended Information, several accused moved to quash the Information. Subsequently, a reinvestigation was ordered based on a sworn statement implicating other police officers. The prosecution moved to discharge SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva as a state witness, which was granted. An Amended Information was filed, discharging Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, and William L. Lopez as state witnesses, substituting SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, and adding P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II, and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña as accused. The trial court denied this Amended Information. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was also denied. The case was re-raffled, and the prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, annulling the trial court's orders and directing the admission of the Amended Information, with a subsequent denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioners SPO4 Marino Soberano, SPO3 Mauro Torres, and SPO3 Jose Escalante filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the admission of the Amended Information. They contend that Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, concerning the discharge of an accused as a state witness, should have been applied instead of Section 14 of Rule 110. They also argue that a motion for reinvestigation is not equivalent to a prior leave of court required under Section 14 of Rule 110, and that the discharge of an accused, once an Information has been filed, rests with the court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the admission of the Amended Information. Whether Section 14 of Rule 110 or Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should apply to the discharge of accused as state witnesses before arraignment; and whether a motion for reinvestigation is equivalent to a prior leave of court for amendment of an information. Whether the discharge of accused under Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection Program) is a prerequisite for their exclusion from an amended information.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals with a modification. The Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the orders of the trial court dated October 1, 2001, and October 24, 2001. The Court ordered the admission of the Amended Information dated September 17, 2001, which substituted SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, charged P/Senior Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Senior Supt. Cezar Mancao II, and P/Senior Supt. Teofilo Viña as additional accused, and discharged or excluded Jimmy L. Lopez, William L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, and P/Sr. Supt. Glen G. Dumlao from the Amended Information. The Court modified the Court of Appeals' decision to include P/Sr. Supt. Glen G. Dumlao as one of the accused excluded from the Amended Information.
Ratio Decidendi
On the applicability of Section 14, Rule 110 vs. Section 17, Rule 119: The Court held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable when an amendment to an information before plea excludes some accused for the purpose of utilizing them as state witnesses. This provision requires a motion by the prosecutor, notice to the offended party, and leave of court. The Court clarified that the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119, concerning the presentation of evidence and sworn statements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness, do not yet apply at this stage. This is because the determination of who to charge is an executive function, and the trial court's grant of a motion for reinvestigation signifies deference to the prosecutorial arm of the government. The Court emphasized that the prosecution possesses wide discretion in disposing of cases, but this discretion is not boundless and must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process. On the nature of a motion for reinvestigation: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court's grant of the prosecution's motion for reinvestigation operated as a prior leave of court to amend the information, if the situation warranted it. This is consistent with the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul, which states that if the fiscal finds it proper to conduct a reinvestigation, the permission of the court must be secured, and the findings and recommendations should be submitted to the court for appropriate action. The Court found no impairment of the substantial rights of the accused or the right to due process in this instance. On the discharge of accused as state witnesses: The Court reiterated that the determination of who should be criminally charged is an executive function. While the trial court has discretion to grant or deny amendments, its denial in this case was based on a misapplication of Section 17, Rule 119, without stating specific reasons. The Court found that the trial court erred in this lapse. The Court also clarified that the exclusion of an accused from an information for the purpose of utilizing them as state witnesses does not necessitate their admission into the Witness Protection Program (WPP) under Republic Act No. 6981. The disqualification of Glen Dumlao from the WPP due to being a law enforcement officer did not prohibit his discharge from the information.
Main Doctrine
An amendment to an information before plea which excludes an accused for the purpose of utilizing them as state witnesses requires compliance with Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which mandates a motion by the prosecutor, notice to the offended party, and leave of court. The procedural requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness under Section 17, Rule 119, do not yet apply at this stage, as the determination of who to charge is an executive function. However, the trial court's discretion in granting or denying such amendments is not boundless and must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process.