Spouses De Vera v. Agloro

G.R. No. 155673 · 2005-01-14 · J. CALLEJO, SR., J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Spouses Salvador F. De Vera and Feliza V. De Vera obtained a loan from BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., secured by a real estate mortgage over their property. Upon defaulting on the loan payments, the Bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The Bank emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction, and subsequently, a certificate of sale was issued, leading to the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the Bank's name. Procedural History: The Spouses De Vera filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) seeking the nullification of the mortgage and the foreclosure sale. Concurrently, the Bank filed an ex parte petition for a writ of possession. The Spouses moved to suspend the proceedings in the writ of possession case pending the resolution of their nullification complaint, but the RTC denied this motion, citing jurisprudence that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty. The Spouses' motion for reconsideration was also denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC. The CA dismissed their petition, affirming the RTC's decision. The Spouses then filed the present petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Petition: The Spouses De Vera filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision. They argued that the CA erred in not suspending the proceedings for the writ of possession due to the pendency of their civil case challenging the mortgage and foreclosure, and that the RTC should have consolidated the two cases. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court upon the expiration of the redemption period and the consolidation of ownership, and that consolidation is discretionary and not mandatory, especially when one case is summary and the other is adversarial.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not suspending the proceedings for the writ of possession despite the pendency of a civil case seeking the nullity of the mortgage and foreclosure. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion for reconsideration and in issuing the writ of possession. Whether the trial court was mandated to consolidate the petition for writ of possession with the civil case for nullification.

Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of suspending the proceedings for the writ of possession: The Court reiterated that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a ministerial duty of the court. This right to possession becomes absolute after the expiration of the one-year redemption period without redemption. The pendency of a separate civil action questioning the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure does not serve as a legal impediment to the issuance of the writ. The Court emphasized that the ex parte petition for a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding, not an ordinary civil action, and is granted without notice to the adversely interested party. Therefore, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suspend proceedings. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. The judge correctly applied the established jurisprudence that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty. The Spouses De Vera had already lost their interest in the property upon failure to redeem it within the statutory period. The Bank, as the purchaser, had an absolute right to possession, which the court was bound to enforce. The fact that the Spouses were impleaded in the ex parte petition did not alter the summary nature of the proceeding, nor did it negate the ministerial duty of the court. On the issue of consolidation of cases: The Court affirmed the CA's ruling that consolidation is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court, as provided under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. The Court found that the trial court acted within its sound judicial discretion in denying the motion for consolidation. The nature of the ex parte petition for a writ of possession as a summary, non-litigious proceeding contrasted with the adversarial nature of the civil action for nullification. Consolidating them would have prejudiced the Bank, which had already adduced its evidence in the writ of possession case. Furthermore, the issue of consolidation had become moot and academic as the writ of possession had already been issued and the Spouses had already been placed in possession, and their appeal was pending.

Main Doctrine

The issuance of a writ of possession in favor of a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a ministerial duty of the court, and the pendency of a separate civil action questioning the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of the writ.

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