R Transport Corp. v. Philippine Hawk Transport Corp.
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from Civil Case No. 61983, where the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162, rendered a decision against R Transport Corporation (petitioner). The core dispute revolved around the proper service of this decision and the subsequent timeline for filing an appeal. Procedural History: The trial court initially sent its decision to petitioner's counsel, Atty. Jose O. Uy Jr., but it was returned unserved as the counsel had moved. Subsequently, the respondent filed a Motion for Execution. The trial court ordered that the petitioner be furnished a copy of this motion, which the petitioner received on March 13, 2000. The petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on March 23, 2000. However, the trial court denied this appeal and granted the motion for execution, a decision that was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals when it denied the petitioner's special civil action for certiorari and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Petition: The petitioner seeks review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision. The central argument is that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by denying due course to the appeal. Petitioner contends that the reglementary period to appeal should have commenced on March 13, 2000, the date of actual receipt of the decision, not an earlier date when service was attempted but failed. Petitioner also argues that a timely appeal would have divested the trial court of jurisdiction to grant the motion for execution. The respondent counters that service was properly effected via substituted service to the counsel's last known address and that the petitioner is bound by the negligence of its counsel.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution and denying due course to the appeal filed by the petitioner. Whether the reglementary period to appeal should be counted from March 13, 2000, the date petitioner actually received a copy of the decision, or from an earlier date.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution and denying due course to the appeal: The Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The service of the decision was properly made to petitioner's counsel, Atty. Uy, at his last known address. Although the copy was returned, there was still proper service by substituted service under Section 8, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court. The records showed that Atty. Uy actively participated in the proceedings until the respondent rested its case. The general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel applies, and the exceptions in Legarda and Escudero were found inapplicable as the negligence of Atty. Uy in failing to notify the court of his change of address was not so gross as to deprive petitioner of due process. The Court reiterated that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and must be exercised strictly in accordance with law. Failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period renders the judgment final and executory, giving the winning party the right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed the appeal as it was filed out of time. On whether the reglementary period to appeal should be counted from March 13, 2000: The Court affirmed the appellate court's finding that service was properly effected earlier. Under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, if a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon his counsel. The decision was sent to Atty. Uy's last known address. The fact that it was returned due to the counsel having moved does not invalidate the service, especially when other pleadings were received. Substituted service under Section 8, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court was deemed complete at the time of delivery to the clerk of court after failure of personal service and service by mail. Therefore, the notice of appeal filed on March 23, 2000, was indeed filed out of time, as it was filed more than two years after the substituted service was completed. The petitioner's insistence on the March 13, 2000 date was contrary to the established rules on service and the binding effect of counsel's actions.
Main Doctrine
A client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel, unless the negligence of counsel is so gross as to deprive the client of due process of law. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly in accordance with law, and failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period renders the judgment final and executory.