Republic v. Evangelista
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from a complaint for damages and injunction filed by private respondent Dante Legaspi, through his attorney-in-fact Paul Gutierrez, against petitioners Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Maj. David B. Diciano. The dispute centers on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into by petitioner Calimlim, representing the Republic of the Philippines, with one Ciriaco Reyes, granting Reyes a permit to hunt for treasure on land owned by Legaspi. It was alleged that Reyes, along with the petitioners, commenced digging, tunneling, and blasting activities on Legaspi's land, and that petitioner Calimlim assigned military personnel to guard the area, thereby intimidating Legaspi and other occupants. Procedural History: Following the alleged illegal entry and activities on his land, Dante Legaspi appointed Paul Gutierrez as his attorney-in-fact to manage treasure hunting activities and file charges. Gutierrez subsequently filed a complaint for damages and injunction against the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The RTC, through respondent Judge Victorino Evangelista, initially issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Gutierrez's Special Power of Attorney (SPA) had been revoked and that they were not responsible for the armed men guarding the area. They also filed a Motion for Inhibition against the judge. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, finding that the diggings were on Legaspi's land and that the SPA remained valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Petition: The petitioners brought this case before the Supreme Court, raising three main issues: (1) whether the agency contract between Legaspi and Gutierrez was effectively revoked; (2) whether the complaint against the petitioners should be dismissed; and (3) whether the respondent judge should have inhibited himself. The petitioners argued that Legaspi had revoked Gutierrez's SPA, that Gutierrez failed to establish the petitioners' involvement in the alleged illegal activities, and that the judge exhibited partiality. The Supreme Court, however, found no merit in the petition, affirming the lower courts' decisions and holding that the agency was coupled with an interest and thus irrevocable, the preliminary injunction was justified, and there was no sufficient basis to prove the judge's bias. The Court noted that the issue of inhibition had become moot due to the judge's death.
Issue(s)
Whether the contract of agency between Legaspi and Gutierrez was effectively revoked by Legaspi. Whether the complaint against petitioners should be dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued. Whether respondent judge ought to have inhibited himself from further proceeding with the case.
Ruling
The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition and affirmed the orders of the trial court dated March 23 and April 4, 2000. The Court directed the presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City to proceed with dispatch in hearing the main case for damages.
Ratio Decidendi
On the revocation of the agency: The Court held that the agency granted by Legaspi to Gutierrez was coupled with interest, making it irrevocable at the sole will of Legaspi. This is because the agency was part of a bilateral contract where Gutierrez was given the power to manage treasure hunting activities, file cases, engage lawyers, and dig for treasure, with a 40% share of any found treasure. Furthermore, Gutierrez hired Atty. Adaza, who was to receive 30% of Legaspi's share as legal fees. The Court cited Article 1927 of the Civil Code, stating that an agency cannot be revoked if it is constituted as a clause in a bilateral contract. Therefore, the Deed of Revocation executed by Legaspi had no effect, and Gutierrez's authority to file and continue the case remained valid. The Court agreed with the findings of the trial and appellate courts that the agency was indeed coupled with interest. On the dismissal of the complaint and issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction: The Court ruled that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was justified. A preliminary injunction is a preventive remedy to protect or preserve rights during the pendency of an action. Its aim is to preserve the status quo ante upon showing that the right to be protected prima facie exists and the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. The Court found that respondent judge had sufficient basis, as it was established prima facie that Legaspi had a right to peaceful possession of his land. The diggings were conducted within Legaspi's property, and whether the fenced area exceeded the land covered by Legaspi's title was a factual issue for the main case. The writ was necessary to preserve the rights and interests of Legaspi and Gutierrez. The Court reiterated that only prima facie evidence is needed for the issuance of such a writ, not conclusive proof. On the inhibition of the respondent judge: The Court found no sufficient basis to hold that the respondent judge should have recused himself. It stated that bias and partiality cannot be presumed and bare allegations are insufficient without a clear showing. The Court emphasized that a judge's appreciation of evidence or rulings on objections, without proof of malice, does not show bias or partiality. Adverse or erroneous rulings do not prove bias unless the bias stems from an extrajudicial source. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, even if erroneous, do not prove bias if based on the evidence. The Court also noted that the issue of inhibition became moot and academic due to the judge's death during the pendency of the case.
Main Doctrine
An agency is considered coupled with interest and thus irrevocable at the sole will of the principal when it is constituted as a clause in a bilateral contract, meaning the agency is inserted in another agreement, and the agency shall then follow the condition of the bilateral agreement. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction requires a prima facie showing that the applicant has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for.