Santos v. Go
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners, as directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI), entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC) for the development of a large tract of land. FEPI subsequently entered into a Contract to Sell with respondent Wilson Go for a subdivision lot, representing itself as the owner. Go fully paid the purchase price, but FEPI failed to develop the property or deliver the title, citing disputes with agrarian reform claimants and a cease and desist order from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Go demanded a refund, which FEPI refused, leading Go to file a complaint with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and a separate criminal complaint for estafa against the petitioners. Procedural History: The City Prosecutor of Pasig City initially dismissed Go's estafa complaint for insufficiency of evidence, finding no misrepresentation and questioning jurisdiction. Go appealed this resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Secretary of Justice reversed the City Prosecutor's decision, finding a prima facie case for estafa and directing the filing of an information. Consequently, an information for estafa was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasig City. While the arraignment was deferred for other respondents, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43, challenging the DOJ's resolution. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that Rule 43 was an improper mode of appeal from the Secretary of Justice's resolution, as the function of conducting a preliminary investigation is executive, not quasi-judicial. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: The petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution, arguing that the CA erred in ruling that Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not a proper mode of appeal from the Secretary of Justice's resolutions. They also contend that the DOJ Secretary erred in finding probable cause for estafa, asserting that they did not misrepresent ownership, FEPI was not required to be the owner at the time of the contract, no prejudice was caused, and there was no deceit or intent to deceive. The Supreme Court, however, frames the primary issue as whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is the correct procedural vehicle for appealing the Secretary of Justice's resolution in a preliminary investigation, and whether such a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature. The Court ultimately denies the petition, affirming the CA's dismissal, and notes that the issues raised by the petitioners regarding probable cause involve factual matters not suitable for a Rule 45 petition for certiorari.
Issue(s)
Whether a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the filing of an information. Whether the conduct of a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor and its review by the Secretary of Justice are quasi-judicial functions. Whether the Secretary of Justice erred in finding probable cause to file an information for estafa against the petitioners.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that Rule 43 is not the proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the filing of an information, as the DOJ is not among the agencies enumerated in Rule 43 and the function is executive, not quasi-judicial. The Court also found no basis to reverse the DOJ's finding of probable cause, as factual issues were raised and courts generally do not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor unless there is grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of appeal under Rule 43: The Court held that Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies. The Department of Justice is not enumerated among the agencies whose decisions are appealable under Section 1 of Rule 43. The principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius applies, meaning the inclusion of certain agencies implies the exclusion of others not listed. Therefore, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa was not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for review on this ground. On the nature of preliminary investigation: The Court clarified that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. The prosecutor does not determine guilt or innocence, nor does he exercise adjudication or rule-making functions. It is merely inquisitorial, aimed at discovering persons reasonably chargeable with a crime and enabling the fiscal to prepare a complaint or information. While the fiscal makes a determination of probable cause, he does not act as a quasi-court, as it is ultimately the courts that pass judgment. Therefore, the Department of Justice, in reviewing the findings of a public prosecutor regarding probable cause, is not exercising a quasi-judicial function. On the review of the Secretary of Justice's finding of probable cause: The Court stated that it was not inclined to reverse the findings of probable cause by the DOJ, especially since the petition was filed under Rule 45, which covers only pure questions of law. The petition raised factual matters such as ownership of the property, existence of deceit, and petitioners' knowledge or participation, which are outside the scope of a Rule 45 petition and require evaluation of evidence. Furthermore, courts generally cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged, and the decision to dismiss or proceed with an investigation depends on the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and ultimately the Secretary of Justice. Such findings are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion, which was not sufficiently shown by the petitioners in this case.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court cannot be availed of to appeal a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the filing of an information, as the Department of Justice is not among the quasi-judicial agencies enumerated in Rule 43, and the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an executive function, not a quasi-judicial one.