People v. Emprese
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private complainants were appointed as Agricultural Technologist and various Utility Worker and Construction/Maintenance Man positions by the then Mayor of San Andres, Quezon. Upon assuming office, the private respondent, Sergio F. Emprese, Sr., revoked these appointments. The private complainants filed a complaint for illegal termination and nonpayment of salaries with the Civil Service Commission, Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO-IV), which ruled in their favor, ordering reinstatement and payment of back wages. Procedural History: The private respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission, Central Office (CSC Central), which reversed the CSCRO-IV's order, declaring the termination valid. The CSC Central's resolution was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals, which reinstated the CSCRO-IV's order, finding that the CSC Central's resolution was issued without jurisdiction as the CSCRO-IV's order had already become final and executory. The Petition: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan charging private respondent with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for allegedly failing to reinstate the complainants and pay back wages despite the finality of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Sandiganbayan granted the private respondent's Motion to Quash the Information, ruling that the acts charged did not constitute a violation of R.A. 3019 and that the private respondent acted in good faith by reinstating the complainants after his motion for clarification was pending. The Sandiganbayan also considered an Affidavit of Desistance executed by some private complainants. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Ombudsman, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the Sandiganbayan's resolutions.
Issue(s)
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information; and whether or not the propriety of the remedy availed of was correct. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly quashed the Information on the grounds that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and that the Information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; and whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance executed by some private complainants, along with the reinstatement and partial payment of back wages, is a valid basis for dismissing the criminal case, considering the timing of the filing of the Information relative to the execution of the CSC order.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information. The Court also found that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was an inappropriate remedy, as the proper recourse was an appeal under Rule 45, which was filed out of time. Even on the merits, the Court found that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion because, at the time the Information was filed, there was no writ or order from the Civil Service Commission compelling the private respondent to reinstate the complainants and pay back wages.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy and jurisdiction: The Supreme Court reiterated that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action that lies only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan quashing the Information was a final order that disposed of the case. Therefore, the proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner failed to file this appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Resorting to certiorari under Rule 65 after losing the remedy of appeal is impermissible, as these remedies are mutually exclusive. The Court emphasized that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion and the merits of the Motion to Quash: The Supreme Court clarified that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Such abuse must be patent and gross, amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. In this case, the Sandiganbayan's ruling was not attended by grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court found that the Sandiganbayan correctly quashed the Information. The core of the charge under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 is the failure to reinstate and pay back wages despite a final and executory order. However, the material timeline showed that the Information was filed on January 28, 2002, while the Urgent Motion for Execution was still pending before the CSC. On the Affidavit of Desistance and the timing of the offense: It was only on February 20, 2002, that the CSC granted the motion. Therefore, at the time of the filing of the Information, there was no definitive order from the CSC that the private respondent had failed to comply with. The Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the accused could not be charged for failure to enforce a decision whose execution was still pending was legally sound. The subsequent reinstatement and partial payment of back wages, along with the Affidavit of Desistance, further supported the dismissal, although the primary ground for dismissal was the lack of a clear legal mandate at the time of the alleged offense.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for an appeal under Rule 45, especially when the latter remedy was lost due to failure to file within the reglementary period. Furthermore, a motion to quash an information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be granted if, at the time of the filing of the information, there was no writ or order compelling the accused public officer to perform the act for which he is being charged.