Estolas v. Acena
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Raymundo Acena was appointed Administrative Officer with permanent status at Rizal Technological College (RTC) in 1982. In 1985, he received a promotional appointment as Associate Professor, effective November 1, 1985, and was concurrently designated Acting Administrative Officer. Acena assumed the Associate Professor position but later rejected the appointment on January 9, 1986, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 4 which required a masteral degree for permanent appointment as Associate Professor. President Profeta accepted the rejection on January 13, 1986. On March 26, 1986, Dr. Josefina Estolas became Officer-in-Charge of RTC. On April 8, 1986, Estolas issued Memorandum Order No. 30, revoking Acena's designation as Acting Administrative Officer and appointing Ricardo Salvador in his stead. Acena filed a civil case for injunction and damages, claiming violation of his security of tenure, and a letter-complaint with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for illegal termination. The CSC later approved Acena's Associate Professor appointment as temporary due to his lack of educational qualifications. On March 23, 1987, the CSC Chairperson issued an opinion favoring Acena, holding he was still the Administrative Officer with permanent status as his Associate Professor appointment had been withdrawn. The trial court issued a preliminary mandatory injunction enjoining Estolas from implementing Memorandum Order No. 30. The MSPB initially dismissed Acena's complaint but later set aside its order. Estolas appealed to the Office of the President, which was indorsed to the CSC. On October 9, 1989, CSC Resolution No. 89-748 declared Estolas's action in revoking Acena's designation as Acting Administrative Officer in order, setting aside the CSC Chairperson's opinion and the MSPB's order. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 168, rendered a Decision on February 17, 1993, ordering Estolas and Salvador jointly and severally liable for P75,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in its entirety. Petitioners Josefina Estolas and Ricardo Salvador filed a petition for review on certiorari. The Petition: Petitioners sought the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that Estolas did not act in bad faith when issuing Memorandum Order No. 30 and that the award of moral and exemplary damages to Acena was improper.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioner Estolas acted in bad faith when she issued Memorandum Order No. 30; and whether petitioner Salvador acted in bad faith. Whether moral and exemplary damages were properly awarded to respondent Acena, and the extent of each petitioner's liability.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision with modification. It ruled that petitioner Ricardo Salvador did not act in bad faith and therefore cannot be held liable for damages. However, it agreed with the lower courts that petitioner Josefina V. Estolas acted in bad faith and is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The dispositive portion ordered petitioner Josefina V. Estolas to pay respondent Raymundo Acena P75,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of bad faith of Petitioner Estolas: The Court found that petitioner Estolas acted in bad faith. This conclusion was based on several acts, including the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 30 despite Acena's rejection of the Associate Professor appointment and his permanent status as Administrative Officer. The Court noted that Estolas resubmitted Acena's appointment papers to the CSC without informing it of the pending case and the withdrawal of the appointment. Furthermore, Estolas allowed payrolls to be prepared indicating Acena as an Associate Professor, contrary to the trial court's injunction and the CSC's determination, even when Acena signed under protest. The Court emphasized that these actions demonstrated a disregard for Acena's rights and the court's orders, constituting bad faith. On the issue of bad faith of Petitioner Salvador: The Court found no rational basis to conclude that petitioner Salvador acted in bad faith. The evidence did not support allegations that he continued to perform duties despite a preliminary injunction. The Court held that the presumption of good faith should hold for Salvador, as Acena failed to discharge his burden of proving bad faith or conspiracy with Estolas. Salvador was merely accepting a designation from his superior and exercising the functions of the office, without evidence of malicious intent. On the award of moral and exemplary damages: The Court affirmed the award of moral damages against petitioner Estolas, finding her actuations in removing Acena from his permanent position and forcing a temporary one upon him to be wrongful under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Acena testified to suffering insult, embarrassment, humiliation, serious anxiety, and sleepless nights, necessitating tranquilizers, which the Court found credible given his position and the protracted dispute. The award of exemplary damages was also justified to serve as a deterrent. However, the Court found that since petitioner Salvador did not act in bad faith and there was no proof of conspiracy, he could not be held liable for moral or exemplary damages. The Court reiterated that damages are not presumed and require proof of injury and a culpable act or omission.
Main Doctrine
An employee holding a permanent status in a position cannot be removed therefrom through an 'acting' designation, especially when the withdrawal of the permanent appointment was not validly approved. Furthermore, damages may be awarded if the act complained of is not only hurtful but also wrongful, requiring proof of injury and a culpable act or omission.