Primetown Property Group v. Juntilla
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Teresa C. Aguilar entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) in 1996 for a condominium unit, with delivery expected by June 1998. Aguilar paid P727,921.82 in installments. By 1998, construction had barely begun, leading Aguilar to demand rescission and a refund. PPGI refused, prompting Aguilar to file a complaint with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for rescission and damages. The HLURB ruled in favor of Aguilar, ordering PPGI to refund the payments, pay interest, and damages, and imposing an administrative fine. 2. Procedural History: The HLURB's decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners and declared final and executory. A writ of execution was issued, leading to the levy and auction of PPGI's properties. Aguilar was the highest bidder for a condominium unit, and after PPGI failed to redeem it, a final deed of sale was executed in Aguilar's favor, and a new Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) was issued. Subsequently, Aguilar filed a motion for a writ of possession with the HLURB. Despite PPGI's motion for reconsideration, which argued lack of proper notice, the HLURB granted the writ of possession. The HLURB later denied PPGI's motion for reconsideration, deeming it moot. PPGI then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the HLURB's decision. The CA denied PPGI's motion for reconsideration. 3. The Petition: PPGI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, raising two main issues: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the HLURB's order for a writ of possession despite PPGI not being duly notified of the hearing, thus violating its right to due process; and (2) whether the CA erred in granting possession to Aguilar when the title to the condominium unit had allegedly been wrongly transferred, as it was purportedly sold to another buyer prior to the public auction. PPGI argued that notice of the motion for writ of possession was sent to its old address, not its new principal office, and that the unit was already sold to a third party before the auction. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that PPGI failed to notify the HLURB of its address change and that the notice of sale referred to the location of the levied property, not PPGI's principal office. The Court also noted that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty once title is consolidated, and PPGI's challenge to Aguilar's title constituted a collateral attack.
Issue(s)
Whether the HLURB gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the writ of possession without proper notice to the petitioner, thereby violating its right to due process. Whether the CA erred in affirming the HLURB's order conferring possession in favor of respondent Aguilar despite the alleged prior sale of the condominium unit to another buyer before the public auction, and whether the petitioner's argument constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on Aguilar's title.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the HLURB's order granting the writ of possession.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of due process and proper notice: The Court held that the petitioner failed to notify the HLURB and the respondent of the transfer of its principal office. Therefore, service of the motion for a writ of possession at its last known principal office on record was considered valid. The Court clarified that the address mentioned in the writ of execution and sheriff's notice of sale referred to the location of the levied property, not PPGI's principal office. The receipt of the motion by PPGI's employee, Ramon Reyes, Jr., further supported the finding of valid service. The Court also emphasized that a motion for a writ of possession is an ex parte and summary proceeding, not a litigated motion requiring a formal hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Its issuance is a ministerial duty once proof of title is established, and it is merely an implementation of a prior writ of execution. On the issue of prior sale, ownership, and collateral attack: The Court ruled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner if the property is not redeemed within the redemption period. The issuance of a Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) in favor of respondent Aguilar established her proof of title. The petitioner's argument that the title was wrongfully vested with Aguilar, given a prior sale to other parties, constituted a collateral attack on Aguilar's title, which is impermissible in a direct proceeding. The Court noted that the Register of Deeds had already cancelled the previous CCT and issued a new one in Aguilar's name, making her the registered owner entitled to possession.
Main Doctrine
A writ of possession is an implementation of a writ of execution and is an ex parte and summary proceeding. The issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court once the buyer in a foreclosure sale has sufficiently shown proof of title, as the buyer is entitled to possession of the property.