Macapagal v. Remorin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Candido Caluza was the registered owner of Lots 24 and 25. After his death, his second wife, Purificacion Arce-Caluza, and his legally adopted daughter, Corazon Caluza-Bamrungcheep, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. Corazon was adjudicated Lots 24 and 25, with administration entrusted to Purificacion. While Corazon was in Thailand, Purificacion executed an Affidavit of Loss for the titles, obtained new ones in her name, and subsequently sold the lots to Catalina Remorin. Catalina then mortgaged the lots. Corazon filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages, and a criminal complaint for falsification and perjury against Purificacion and Catalina. A Deed of Transfer was executed by Catalina, admitting the illegal transfer and acknowledging Corazon as the rightful owner. Catalina's title was cancelled, and a new one was issued in Corazon's name. Prior to this, Catalina mortgaged the lots to Laurelia Caluza-Valenciano to pay off her previous mortgage. A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by Corazon, Purificacion, Catalina, and Laurelia to settle the civil and criminal cases. Purificacion died before the agreement could be implemented. A Compromise Agreement was then executed by Corazon and Catalina, approved by the RTC. Subsequently, Corazon sold Lot 5 to Laurelia. Catalina then sold the same lot to petitioner Mariquita Macapagal. Laurelia filed an ejectment suit against petitioner, and petitioner filed a complaint for nullification of contract and damages against Catalina, Corazon, and Laurelia. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's decision. The Supreme Court is now reviewing the Court of Appeals' decision. The Petition: Petitioner contends that the sale executed by Catalina in her favor should prevail over the sale executed by Corazon in favor of Laurelia, as Catalina was authorized to sell the property under the Compromise Agreement. Respondents argue that Corazon, as the registered owner, did not authorize Catalina to sell the lot, considering Catalina's prior connivance with Purificacion.
Issue(s)
Whether the sale executed by Catalina Remorin in favor of petitioner Mariquita Macapagal prevails over the sale executed by Corazon Caluza-Bamrungcheep in favor of respondent Laurelia Caluza-Valenciano. Whether Catalina Remorin was authorized to sell the disputed property under the Compromise Agreement.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 8, 2002, as well as its Resolution dated May 7, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 44814 is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the sale executed by Catalina Remorin in favor of petitioner Mariquita Macapagal prevails over the sale executed by Corazon Caluza-Bamrungcheep in favor of respondent Laurelia Caluza-Valenciano: The Court ruled in favor of respondents. Corazon was the registered owner of the disputed Lot 5 at the time of the sales. As owner, she had the right to enjoy and dispose of the property. The Compromise Agreement did not grant Catalina the authority to sell the property. It merely stipulated that Catalina would pay off her mortgage obligation and incidental expenses from the proceeds of the sale, implying that the money might be handed over to her for payment, not that she herself would conduct the sale. The language of the Compromise Agreement did not explicitly and clearly convey an intent to abandon Corazon's right to sell or to grant such authority to Catalina. Any reasonable doubt regarding authority to sell will be construed against the grant of such authority, which must be couched in clear and unmistakable language. On whether Catalina Remorin was authorized to sell the disputed property under the Compromise Agreement: The Court found that the Compromise Agreement did not confer authority upon Catalina to sell the property. Even if the parties intended to grant such authority, they did not intend the Agreement itself to be the document of sale. They agreed to execute other necessary documents, which they did not. Under Article 1878, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is required for an agent to enter into contracts transmitting ownership of immovable property. Catalina admitted she did not have such a document. Furthermore, petitioner, as a stranger to the Compromise Agreement, cannot demand its enforcement. Petitioner cannot be considered a buyer in good faith because she did not buy the lot from its registered owner. In double sales, ownership passes to the vendee who, in good faith, first recorded it. Laurelia's title was issued first, making her the rightful owner.
Main Doctrine
In cases of double sale of real property, ownership passes to the vendee who, in good faith, first recorded it in the Registry of Property. A buyer who does not purchase from the registered owner cannot be considered a buyer in good faith. Furthermore, authority to sell immovable property must be couched in clear and unmistakable language, and a special power of attorney is necessary for an agent to enter into contracts transmitting ownership of immovable property.