Camid v. Office of the President
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the purported continued existence of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur. This municipality was created by Executive Order No. 107 in 1964. However, in the landmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965), this Court declared Executive Order No. 107, along with thirty-three other executive orders creating municipalities, void ab initio. The Court found that the President lacked the constitutional authority to create municipalities through executive fiat, as this power is inherently legislative and the relevant statute, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, did not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power. Procedural History: Following the Supreme Court's declaration in Pelaez v. Auditor General that Executive Order No. 107 was void ab initio, the Municipality of Andong ceased to have legal personality. Despite this ruling, the petitioner, Sultan Osop B. Camid, a resident and taxpayer, claims that Andong continues to function as a municipality with officials and services. He asserts that subsequent laws and jurisprudence, specifically Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, have implicitly recognized or validated the existence of municipalities created by executive order, even those previously declared void. The petitioner's claim is further fueled by a Certification from the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) that lists eighteen other municipalities, also declared void in Pelaez, as existing. The Petition: The petitioner, Sultan Osop B. Camid, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, assailing a DILG Certification dated November 21, 2003, which did not include Andong among the list of existing municipalities. He argues that the DILG committed grave abuse of discretion by not classifying Andong as an existing municipality, especially in light of the DILG's recognition of eighteen other municipalities similarly annulled in Pelaez. Camid contends that Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, and the jurisprudence interpreting it, particularly Municipality of San Narciso, have validated the existence of municipalities created by executive order, even those previously declared void. He seeks to have Andong classified as a regular existing municipality, with its officials recognized and its internal revenue allotments released. The petition also implicitly seeks to overturn the Pelaez ruling as it applies to Andong, arguing that subsequent legal developments have modified its effect.
Issue(s)
Whether the Municipality of Andong, whose creation by Executive Order was declared null and void ab initio by this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, can attain recognition as a de facto municipal corporation. Whether Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 can retroactively validate the existence of a municipality expressly annulled by this Court. Whether the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is the proper remedy given the factual nature of the claims and the procedural requirements; and the path forward for residents.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed that the Municipality of Andong, having been declared null and void ab initio by this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, does not legally exist and cannot attain recognition as a de facto municipal corporation. The Court also held that Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not serve to affirm or reconstitute judicially dissolved municipalities.
Ratio Decidendi
On the existence of the Municipality of Andong: The Court reiterated its ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965) which declared Executive Order No. 107, creating the Municipality of Andong, null and void ab initio. The phrase "ab initio" signifies that the annulment was effective from the very beginning. This ruling has been consistently affirmed in subsequent cases such as Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. Therefore, Andong has never legally existed as a municipality since its inception. The Court emphasized that judicial decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by aggrieved parties. The continued existence of barangay units or the issuance of certifications by local government agencies regarding land area and population do not confer legal personality upon a municipality that has been judicially declared void. These certifications were issued upon the request of the petitioner to support the restoration of Andong, implicitly acknowledging its current inoperative status. The Court distinguished Andong from municipalities that have attained de facto status. The existence of a de facto municipal corporation requires a factual demonstration of continuous exercise of corporate powers with the acquiescence of the state. While Pelaez did not nullify all municipalities created by executive order, it expressly annulled Andong. To grant Andong de facto status despite this express annulment would be to condone defiance of a Supreme Court order. Furthermore, Andong fails to meet the specific requirement of Section 442(d) that it must have had a set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the Code's effectivity, a condition that Camid himself admits was not met due to the annulment of Andong and the subsequent cessation of municipal elections and fund allocation. On the applicability of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991: The Court clarified that Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which states that municipalities organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders with elective officials holding office at the effectivity of the Code shall be considered regular municipalities, does not apply to municipalities like Andong whose creation was expressly annulled by this Court. The provision was intended to cure defects in the creation of municipalities that were not judicially nullified, such as those recognized in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals, and Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz. These cases involved municipalities created by executive order that were not expressly annulled by Pelaez and had, over time, attained de facto or even de jure status through legislative recognition or acquiescence. Andong, however, was expressly annulled, and Section 442(d) cannot be used to revive a judicially dissolved entity. The Court noted that the eighteen (18) other municipalities similarly annulled in Pelaez but certified as existing by the DILG had been reconstituted through subsequent legislative enactments, a step Andong has not undergone. On the procedural issues and path forward for residents: The Court found that the petition was not a fit subject for certiorari and mandamus as it involved a de novo appreciation of factual questions, which is beyond the Court's original jurisdiction as a trier of facts. The petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the hierarchy of courts, as the factual claims should have been initially presented before a trial court or administrative body. The DILG certification, which was assailed, did not create or revalidate a municipality, and its annulment would not serve the petitioner's ultimate cause. The petition was therefore premature and procedurally flawed. The Court clarified that the legal effect of the nullification of Andong was to revert its constituent barrios back to their original municipalities. If the residents desire the reconstitution of Andong, the proper recourse is through legislative action, not judicial confirmation of a void title. The Court suggested that an expedient political and legislative solution might be necessary if the residents have indeed been governed by an "Interim Government" despite the judicial dissolution of their municipality.
Main Doctrine
A municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court cannot attain recognition as a de facto municipal corporation, especially when its creation was expressly annulled and no subsequent curative or reimplementing statute has been enacted.