Amadore v. Romulo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Leoncio A. Amadore, then Director of PAGASA, entered into a contract with Inter-Technical Pacific Philippines, Inc. (INTERPAC) for the supply and installation of a Weather Surveillance Radar System. Subsequently, PAGASA made advance payments to INTERPAC totaling P20,336,133.26, representing 28.9% of the total contract price. This was alleged to be in violation of Section 88 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, which prohibits advance payments for services not yet rendered or supplies not yet delivered without prior presidential approval, and also potentially violating Section 88 of P.D. 1445. Procedural History: The Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) investigated the matter and recommended the dismissal of petitioner Amadore, along with Deputy Directors Ferraris and Angeles, from government service. The Executive Secretary, Alberto G. Romulo, approved this recommendation in a decision dated November 12, 2001. Petitioner and his co-respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration, which was denied by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite on April 15, 2003. A second motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied with finality on May 29, 2003. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed his petition for review on June 19, 2003, for being filed out of time. The Court of Appeals later denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on January 12, 2004. The Petition: Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for review and denying his motion for reconsideration, as well as the decisions of the Executive Secretary and the Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs dismissing him from government service. The core arguments raised by the petitioner are that his dismissal was illegal as it did not comply with the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1594, that his second motion for reconsideration should have been allowed as a meritorious case, and that he should be reinstated. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that the petition before the Court of Appeals was not filed within the reglementary period and that petitioner is raising factual issues improperly.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed within the reglementary period. Whether petitioner may raise factual issues before the Supreme Court. Whether petitioner violated P.D. No. 1594 and P.D. No. 1445 by approving advance payments exceeding the allowed limit. Whether the administrative case should be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review for having been filed out of time. However, it found that petitioner violated P.D. No. 1594 and P.D. No. 1445, and thus affirmed the dismissal from government service.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the appeal to the Court of Appeals: The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, which governs appeals to the Office of the President, allows a second motion for reconsideration in exceptionally meritorious cases. The Court found that petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, which sought to present new evidence, qualified as such. Therefore, the reglementary period to appeal to the Court of Appeals should have been reckoned from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration, not the first. The Court emphasized that the rules of the Office of the President, not the Rules of Court, should govern the number of motions for reconsideration allowed. On the raising of factual issues before the Supreme Court: The Court acknowledged that while generally factual issues are not entertained in a petition for review on certiorari, it opted to set aside technicalities in the interest of justice to consider the newly discovered pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The Court reiterated that rules of procedure are liberally construed in proceedings before administrative bodies to secure substantial justice, not to override it. The Court then proceeded to evaluate the merits of the case, including the factual assertions regarding the delivery of the equipment. On the alleged violation of P.D. No. 1594 and P.D. No. 1445: The Court found that petitioner violated P.D. No. 1594. The contract was categorized as an infrastructure project, allowing an advance payment of up to fifteen percent (15%) of the total contract price under its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Court determined that the payments made on January 14, 1997, and August 13, 1997, totaling P20,336,133.26 or 28.9% of the contract price, constituted advance payments because the delivery of the radar equipment was not made at the project sites (Baguio and Tanay) as stipulated in the contract. The request for temporary storage at PAGASA, Diliman, Quezon City, did not constitute delivery. Therefore, the advance payment exceeded the 15% limit. The Court also found that petitioner violated Section 88 of P.D. No. 1445. This section prohibits advance payments for services not yet rendered or supplies not yet delivered without the prior approval of the President. The initial advance payment of P7,212,857.33 (10% of the contract price) was made without such presidential approval, thus constituting a clear violation of P.D. No. 1445, irrespective of whether P.D. No. 1594 governed the contract. On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court dismissed the argument of double jeopardy. It explained that the requisites for double jeopardy, including a valid indictment, arraignment, and plea, were absent. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the fundamental principle that an administrative case can proceed independently of a criminal case based on the same act or omission, with the former requiring only a preponderance of evidence.
Main Doctrine
The Court ruled that the appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed within the reglementary period because the denial of the second motion for reconsideration, filed in an exceptionally meritorious case, should have been the reckoning point for the appeal period, not the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, the Court found that the advance payments made exceeded the fifteen percent (15%) limit allowed under P.D. No. 1594 for infrastructure projects, as there was no actual delivery of the radar equipment at the project site prior to the second payment.