Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. v. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. (PLDT) implemented a redundancy program, leading to the abolition of the Provisioning Support Division and the closure of several operator services. This action resulted in the termination of 383 union members and was perceived by the union as unfair labor practices, including violations of the duty to bargain collectively, hiring of casuals for regular jobs, and breaches of collective bargaining agreement provisions on overtime and promotions. 2. Procedural History: The Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) filed notices of strike citing these alleged unfair labor practices. After conciliation efforts failed, MKP staged a strike on December 23, 2002, and PLDT subsequently terminated 383 union members due to redundancy. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, invoking Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, certified the dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and issued a return-to-work order, but excluded those terminated due to redundancy. MKP filed a motion for partial reconsideration, arguing that all workers should be readmitted, which the Secretary noted without action, referring the matter to the NLRC. Aggrieved, MKP filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. 3. The Petition: The Court of Appeals granted MKP's petition, nullifying the Secretary's orders. PLDT then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion by the Secretary and in its interpretation of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. PLDT contended that the Secretary's powers under Article 263(g) are broad and discretionary, and that the exclusion of redundant employees was a valid exercise of this discretion. The core issue before the Supreme Court is whether the Secretary's order, excluding redundant employees from the return-to-work directive, was valid under Article 263(g).
Issue(s)
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari instituted by the respondent before the Court of Appeals was procedurally precise. Whether the subject Orders of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment excluding from the return-to-work Order the workers dismissed due to the redundancy program of petitioner, are valid or not.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding the workers terminated due to redundancy from the return-to-work order. The Court held that Article 263(g) of the Labor Code mandates the readmission of ALL striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, without distinction.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Procedural Propriety of Certiorari): The Court ruled that the institution of the special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was procedurally sound. The private respondent correctly asserted that the Secretary committed an error of jurisdiction when she excluded a certain class of strikers from returning to work, which exceeded her authority under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration, followed by a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, was precisely what the private respondent did, making the petition before the Court of Appeals justly availed of. The core issue raised was whether the Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, which is the sole question cognizable in a certiorari proceeding. The Court reiterated that when an official bypasses the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated. On Issue 2 (Substantive Validity of the Secretary's Orders): The Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Secretary's Orders were invalid. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code is clear and unequivocal in stating that "all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." The Court emphasized that the phrase "all striking or locked out employees" and "readmit all workers" does not distinguish or qualify, and is emphatically a catch-all enumeration. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The Secretary's power under Article 263(g), while broad and discretionary, is not absolute and must be exercised within the confines of the law. The exclusion of the 383 employees terminated due to redundancy from the return-to-work order was a clear violation of the mandatory "all workers" provision of Article 263(g). The prevailing terms and conditions before the strike, which included the employment of these workers, must be maintained as the status quo.
Main Doctrine
When the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike in an industry indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the return-to-work order must unequivocally direct the readmission of ALL striking or locked-out employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout, without distinction or qualification, as the law does not distinguish.