Fuentes v. Valenzuela
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Fe N. Valenzuela, operating as Triple "A" Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services, had been engaged in business in Isabel, Leyte, supplying vessels with commodities and services since 1993. She held permits from the local mayor's office and the Philippine Ports Authority, and was the sole authorized ship chandler for Smith Bell Shipping Company. In January 2002, Valenzuela applied for a renewal of her mayor's permit. Despite the recommendation of various local officials, Mayor Roberto P. Fuentes, Jr. refused to sign the permit, allegedly stating he would not issue it and that she could file any case she wished. Subsequently, Mayor Fuentes issued a memorandum to the port manager instructing them not to allow Valenzuela to conduct ship chandling operations, citing unverified reports of harassment of competitors, smuggling, and drug dealing. This led to the revocation of her temporary permits and hold-over authority, causing her perishable goods to spoil. Procedural History: Valenzuela filed consolidated criminal and administrative complaints against Mayor Fuentes with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in May 2002, charging him with violations of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2001-120, as well as oppression, grave misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion. The Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and filed an Information. In a related administrative case, the Mayor was found guilty of simple misconduct and suspended for three months. Mayor Fuentes filed a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration, which was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman for being filed without leave of court and for reiterating previously considered grounds. He then filed a petition for review with the Ombudsman, which was also denied, as was his subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Roberto P. Fuentes, Jr. filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the Ombudsman's orders denying his petition for review and motion for reconsideration. He argues that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against him. Petitioner contends that the issuance of a business permit is a discretionary power vested in him as mayor and that there was no factual basis for the findings of manifest partiality, bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. He asserts that his refusal to issue the permit was a preventive measure based on reports of illegal activities and that the finding of probable cause was based on conjecture and speculation. The petition further argues that the private respondent did not suffer undue injury, or if she did, the extent of the injury was not proven. The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, argued that the petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion and that proof of the extent of injury is not essential for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Issue(s)
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against the petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Whether the petitioner acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in refusing to issue a mayor's permit to the private respondent. Whether the private respondent suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's refusal to issue the mayor's permit.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The September 12, 2003 and November 17, 2003 Orders of the Ombudsman are AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman: The Court reiterated that it does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion to determine probable cause, as this power is constitutionally mandated and enjoys wide latitude. Grave abuse of discretion requires an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic exercise of power, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty. The petitioner failed to establish such grave abuse. Furthermore, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation was filed without the required prior leave of court, which was a valid ground for denial. On the issue of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence: The Court found that the Deputy Ombudsman correctly declared probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioner refused to renew the private respondent's permit based on raw reports of alleged involvement in prohibited drugs, despite the reports being received after the application was ready for his signature and the investigation taking an unreasonably long time. He disregarded clearances from nine offices, including the PNP, and relied solely on confidential agents' reports. The Court noted that the petitioner influenced the PPA and BOC to revoke the private respondent's special permit, suggesting a personal motive. The petitioner's claim that he would renew the permit after the investigation was deemed dubious, especially since the police investigation had already closed without adverse findings. On the issue of undue injury: The Court affirmed that proof of the extent of injury is not essential for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The law can be violated either by causing undue injury or by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. In this case, the private respondent had already purchased perishable provisions worth thousands of pesos for a vessel when the petitioner issued his memorandum, causing these commodities to rot. This loss of livelihood and substantial financial damage constituted undue injury. The Court cited Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, stating that it is sufficient that the injury suffered or benefits received can be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible. The petitioner's actions deprived the private respondent of her legitimate calling and livelihood on mere suspicion, which is contrary to law.
Main Doctrine
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested with wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, and courts will not ordinarily interfere with its discretion in determining whether probable cause exists. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction requires that the power be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner.