Manly Sportwear v. Dadodette Enterprises
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Special Investigator Eliezer P. Salcedo of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, alleging that Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center were in possession of goods whose copyright belonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc. (MANLY). Procedural History: The RTC issued Search Warrant No. 4044(03). Subsequently, respondents moved to quash the warrant, arguing its invalidity due to non-compliance with requisites. The RTC granted the motion, declaring the warrant null and void, finding that MANLY's products were not original creations and were not protected under Section 172 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, citing earlier registrations of similar sports articles. MANLY's motion for reconsideration was denied. MANLY then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), which was also denied for lack of merit, affirming the RTC's ruling. The CA found that the RTC correctly granted the motion to quash and that its ruling did not preempt the findings of the intellectual property court. The Petition: MANLY filed a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the CA's decision and resolution, raising the sole issue of whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in declaring, during the quashal hearing, that MANLY's products were not original creations subject to RA 8293 protection.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in declaring, in the hearing for the quashal of the search warrant, that the copyrighted products of MANLY are not original creations subject to the protection of RA 8293. Whether the trial court, in an ancillary proceeding for the quashal of a search warrant, may rule on the originality and copyrightability of products; and the nature of copyright certificates and the effect of registration.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The July 13, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79887 and its resolution dated September 15, 2004, are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the trial court's authority to quash a search warrant and rule on copyrightability in an ancillary proceeding: The power to issue search warrants is vested in trial judges, and consequently, the power to quash them also rests solely with them. A judge who has issued a warrant is not precluded from subsequently quashing it if, upon reevaluation of the evidence, no probable cause exists. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entertained the motion to quash, as no criminal action had yet been instituted. The trial court properly quashed the warrant after finding that no probable cause existed, based on its reevaluation that the products did not appear to be original creations and were not among the classes of work enumerated under Section 172 of RA 8293. The trial court's ruling in the ancillary proceeding that the products are not original creations is within its bounds, as it is inevitable that such issues may be touched upon in determining probable cause. This does not usurp the power of, nor preclude, the intellectual property court from making a final judicial determination in a full-blown trial. The finding by the court that no crime exists for purposes of the warrant does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings of a preliminary investigation, nor does it constitute a usurpation of executive function. The court's ruling is provisional and does not preclude the authorized officer from making their own determination. As held in Solid Triangle Sales Corp. v. Sheriff, RTC, Q.C., Br. 93, the court's finding that no crime exists for purposes of issuing or quashing a warrant is only for that specific purpose and does not preclude the investigating officer from filing an information. On the nature of copyright certificates and the effect of registration; and the RTC's jurisdiction to determine probable cause: The certificates of registration issued in favor of MANLY constitute merely prima facie evidence of validity and ownership. However, no presumption of validity is created when other evidence casts doubt on the copyright's validity. Where there is sufficient proof that the copyrighted products are not original creations and are readily available in the market under various brands, validity and originality will not be presumed, and the trial court may properly quash the issued warrant for lack of probable cause. Furthermore, Section 2, Rule 7 of the Copyrights Safeguards and Regulations states that the registration and deposit of a work is purely for recording the date of registration and deposit and shall not be conclusive as to copyright ownership or the term of the copyrights. At most, these certificates serve merely as a notice of recording and registration and do not confer any right or title upon the registered copyright owner or automatically place the work under the protective mantle of copyright law. Non-registration and deposit within the prescribed period only makes the copyright owner liable to pay a fine, but it does not confer copyright ownership. The proceeding for the seizure of property via a search warrant is not a final one and cannot constitute res judicata, as held in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals. The outcome of a criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property. The RTC had jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue whether the petitioner's utility models are copyrightable and, if so, whether he is the owner of a copyright over the said models, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the trial court's finding that the seized products are not copyrightable was merely preliminary and did not finally and permanently adjudicate on their status and character. MANLY could still file a separate copyright infringement suit, as the order for the issuance or quashal of a warrant is not res judicata.
Main Doctrine
A court, in determining probable cause for the issuance or quashal of a search warrant, may touch upon issues properly threshed out in a regular proceeding, and its finding that no offense has been committed for purposes of the warrant does not constitute usurpation of executive function nor does it preclude the investigating officer from making their own determination. Furthermore, the order for the issuance or quashal of a warrant is not res judicata and does not ascertain the permanent status or character of the seized property.