De Jesus v. De Jesus
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents, as legitimate children and heirs of Fermin de Jesus, filed a petition for partition of a parcel of land inherited by their deceased grandparents, Juan and Eustaquia de Jesus, from whom their father Fermin and uncle Pastor de Jesus inherited the property. The property remained titled in the name of Juan de Jesus. Procedural History: The trial court declared null and void an Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Rights and Interests in the Estate of a Deceased Person (Deed of Sale) dated September 13, 1979, and ordered the partition of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in part, declaring the Deed of Sale null and void only with respect to Fermin de Jesus's share, finding his signature to be a forgery based on expert testimony and inconsistencies in the testimonies of Pastor de Jesus and his sister Consolacion. The appellate court also noted Pastor de Jesus's inconsistent statements regarding the Deed of Sale. The Petition: Petitioner Pastor de Jesus assailed the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the testimonies of witnesses to a notarized agreement, including the notary public, should be given more weight than an expert witness's opinion, and that the presumption of regularity of notarized documents was not rebutted.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Deed of Sale null and void despite it being a notarized document, and whether the presumption of regularity of notarized documents was sufficiently rebutted by the evidence presented. Whether the findings of fact of the lower courts regarding the forgery of Fermin de Jesus's signature are binding on the Supreme Court. Whether the nullification of the Deed of Sale should extend to the entire document, considering the forgery of Fermin de Jesus's signature.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the trial court's ruling that the Deed of Sale dated September 13, 1979, is null and void in its entirety. The Court held that the presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, which was sufficiently presented in this case through expert testimony and the courts' own visual comparison of the signatures.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Deed of Sale being null and void and the rebuttal of the presumption of regularity: The Court reiterated that while a notarized document carries the presumption of regularity, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the respondents presented Alicia de Jesus Oakes and Ronaldo de Jesus, who were familiar with Fermin's handwriting, and NBI Handwriting Expert Zenaida Torres. Expert Torres found significant differences between Fermin's purported signature on page two of the Deed of Sale and his standard signatures, noting disparities in the 'T' bar of 'F', the hook of 'E', the formation of 's' in 'Jesus', the tremor in the 'F' crown, and the fundamental difference in the letter 'R'. Even with Fermin's abbreviated signature on page one, Torres indicated potential discrepancies. The courts below, through their own visual examination, also found the signatures to be dissimilar and noted that Fermin consistently signed in full, not in an abbreviated style as seen on page one of the Deed of Sale. Furthermore, the testimonies of Pastor de Jesus and his sister Consolacion were found to be inconsistent and incredible, particularly Consolacion's contradictory statements about Fermin's physical condition and Pastor's shifting explanations about the original Deed of Sale. The trial court also found irregularities in the use of two typewriters for the document. These combined factors constituted clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity. On the binding nature of the lower courts' findings of fact: The Court emphasized that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the Court to re-examine the probative value of evidence unless the findings of the lower courts are totally devoid of support, glaringly erroneous, or constitute grave abuse of discretion. The issue of forgery involves a question of fact that had been raised and ruled upon by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Since their findings were borne out by the records and based on substantial evidence, they are generally final and conclusive. The Court found no exceptions applicable in this case that would warrant a deviation from this rule, as the lower courts had sufficient factual basis for their conclusion that the signatures were spurious. On the scope of the nullification of the Deed of Sale: The Court clarified that if the signatures of Fermin were forged, the Deed of Sale is effectively nullified. It reasoned that such a document, being an extrajudicial settlement, requires the assent of all heirs for its validity in partitioning the estate. Therefore, a document bearing forged signatures cannot be considered binding upon any person who did not participate in or have notice of it. Consequently, the Deed of Sale should not be annulled only with respect to Fermin's share but in its entirety, reinstating the trial court's original decision.
Main Doctrine
While a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity and is admissible without proof of due execution, this presumption is not absolute and can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, including expert testimony and the court's own visual comparison of signatures, especially when the genuineness of the signature is the crux of the controversy.