Roble Arrastre v. Villaflor
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. (RAI), a cargo handling service operator, had its permit to operate at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, renewed by the Municipal Mayor (respondent) for 1992 and 1993. While its application for renewal with the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was pending, RAI was granted a 90-day hold-over authority by the PPA. Subsequently, RAI applied for the renewal of its Business Permit No. 276 for 1994 with the respondent mayor, but the application was denied. Procedural History: RAI filed a Petition for Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the respondent mayor, arguing that the mayor's refusal to issue the license was a neglect of a duty enjoined by law, as the power to issue business licenses under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 was merely for revenue generation and not regulation, thus leaving no room for discretion. The respondent mayor countered that the issuance of the permit was not ministerial but required discretion, invoking Municipal Resolution No. 93-27, which prohibited shipping line operators from engaging in arrastre services in Hilongos, and petitioner was owned by Roble Shipping Lines. The RTC ruled in favor of RAI, ordering the mayor to approve the application, stating that the PPA had sole authority over arrastre services and the mayor's refusal was not based on law or discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, holding that the mayor's power was discretionary and mandamus would not lie, and that the case had become moot and academic. The CA dismissed RAI's petition. The Petition: RAI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, raising issues on the interpretation of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC, the applicability of certain cases, and the dismissal of the case on grounds of mootness.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in relying on Mateo v. CA and Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal to rule that the respondent Mayor had full discretion in issuing or renewing the Business Permit despite petitioner's compliance with requirements and full payment of fees; and whether the Court of Appeals validly interpreted Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC as a grant of police power and full discretion to the respondent mayor to refuse the permit issuance despite due compliance. Whether the Court of Appeals validly rendered its Decision by refusing to apply the precedent in Symaco v. Aquino, which held that a mayor cannot refuse a permit if there is prior compliance with requirements and full payment, even without a specific ordinance granting such discretion; and on the applicability of Municipal Resolution No. 93-27. Whether the Court of Appeals validly dismissed the Petition on the ground that it became moot and academic.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the Petition and affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the Special Civil Action No. H-237. The Court found that the case was moot and academic, but nevertheless resolved the issues for the bench and the bar, and because the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review. The Court held that the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is not ministerial but discretionary, as it is an exercise of delegated police power. Therefore, mandamus is not the proper remedy.
Ratio Decidendi
On the nature of the Mayor's power to issue permits and the interpretation of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC: The Court clarified that the power to issue licenses and permits, and to suspend or revoke them, is exercised "pursuant to law or ordinance." This power is linked to Section 16 of the LGC, the general welfare clause, which encapsulates the delegated police power of local government units. Therefore, the exercise of this power by the municipal mayor is not ministerial but involves discretion. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the power to issue licenses must be pursuant to a law other than the LGC itself. The Court stated that when the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, meaning the LGC itself, particularly Section 16 (general welfare clause), can be used to define the bounds of the mayor's discretion. The Court also noted that a municipal license is not a property right and can be revoked when public interest requires it, citing Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal. On the Mayor's discretion, the proper remedy, and the applicability of Municipal Resolution No. 93-27: The Court held that the limits on the municipal mayor's power to issue licenses and permits can be contained in a law or an ordinance. Since the power is derived from the general welfare clause, which is an exercise of delegated police power, it necessarily involves discretion. The Court distinguished between a ministerial act, which is performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment, and a discretionary act, which allows for the exercise of judgment. The refusal to grant a permit, based on factors related to the general welfare or specific local concerns, falls under discretionary power. The Court emphasized that the proper remedy to question the exercise of such discretionary power, particularly if alleged to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion, would be a writ of certiorari, not mandamus. While acknowledging that Municipal Resolution No. 93-27 was a resolution and not an ordinance, the Court stated that this fact did not aid the petitioner's cause. The crucial point was that the mayor's power to issue permits was discretionary. On the issue of mootness: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the main prayer to compel the issuance of a business license for 1994 had become moot and academic due to the passage of time, as new applications for subsequent years would be necessary. The Court reiterated that courts generally do not adjudicate moot cases where no practical relief can be granted. However, the Court found it necessary to resolve the case due to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar, and because the issue presented was "capable of repetition yet evading review."
Main Doctrine
The power of a municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits, as provided under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, is not merely ministerial but involves the exercise of discretion, stemming from the delegated police power of the local government unit. Consequently, a writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy to compel the issuance of such permits; rather, a writ of certiorari is appropriate to review alleged grave abuse of discretion.