Cabrera v. Lapid
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Amelia Cabrera entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan for a tract of land to be used for fishpond operations. She invested approximately P5,000,000.00 in its construction. Subsequently, respondents, including the Governor of Pampanga, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Sasmuan, and the PNP Superintendent of Region 3, ordered the demolition of the fishpond. The demolition was carried out by dynamite blasting on October 10, 1995, allegedly in the presence of media representatives. Petitioner accused the respondents of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code, alleging evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman in November 1995. After preliminary investigation, where respondents submitted counter-affidavits denying the accusations and asserting the fishpond's illegality and obstruction of the Pasak River, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution on May 13, 1996, dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman reasoned that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and could be abated under the State's police power. Petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that municipalities have exclusive authority over fishery privileges and questioning the basis for the nuisance declaration. The Ombudsman, in an Order dated March 21, 1997, affirmed its previous resolution, concluding that the lease agreement was void ab initio due to the property's status and that the demolition was a valid exercise of police power. The Petition: Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order. The petition argues that the Ombudsman erred in ruling the lease contract void, that the demolition was validly made based on a nuisance per se declaration, that the demolition was a proper exercise of police power, that due notice and hearing were not given, and that probable cause did not exist to indict the respondents. The Supreme Court noted that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy for assailing Ombudsman resolutions in criminal cases, which should instead be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and ruling that the demolition of the fishpond was valid. Whether the lease contract between the Municipality of Sasmuan and the petitioner was null and void. Whether the demolition of the fishpond was a valid exercise of police power and abatement of a nuisance per se. Whether probable cause existed to indict the respondents for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for review on certiorari. It held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 45, is the proper remedy to assail resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, and only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion, and merely questioned the Ombudsman's findings and conclusions, the petition was dismissed. The Court also noted that direct appeals from Ombudsman resolutions to the Supreme Court are not sanctioned by procedural rules, and Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which allowed such appeals in administrative cases, was declared unconstitutional.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy: The Court held that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases. The aggrieved party's recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which must allege and prove grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. The Court clarified that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, allowing direct appeals in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, and thus does not apply to criminal cases. By availing of the wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright. On grave abuse of discretion: The Court emphasized that mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient; it must be grave abuse of discretion, characterized by capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner failed to present or substantiate any such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint was based on the finding that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and its demolition was a valid exercise of police power, which the Court found to be within the Ombudsman's supervisory and investigatory powers, not amounting to grave abuse of discretion. On the validity of the lease contract: The Ombudsman concluded that the lease agreement was void ab initio because the property was not declared alienable or disposable by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) is the agency authorized to grant fishpond licenses in such areas. This conclusion was based on harmonizing R.A. No. 7160 with P.D. No. 704. The Court did not directly rule on the validity of the lease but upheld the Ombudsman's finding that the demolition was justified due to the illegality of the structure, which was declared a nuisance per se. On the exercise of police power and abatement of nuisance: The Ombudsman ruled that the demolition was a valid exercise of police power to abate a nuisance per se. The Court upheld this reasoning, noting that the fishpond was found to be an obstruction to the Pasak River and situated on inalienable land. The authority of the district health officer to determine the abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings was also upheld. The Court reiterated that the Ombudsman's finding that the demolition was a valid exercise of police power was not tainted by grave abuse of discretion. On probable cause and the Ombudsman's discretion: The Court reiterated that it is beyond its ambit to review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint, absent grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of probable cause was considered an error of judgment, correctible by appeal, but not via a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court stressed that compelling the Ombudsman to review every dismissal of an investigatory proceeding would cripple the courts.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases; the correct remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's findings on probable cause.