Lucero v. City Government of Pasig
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Ruperto Lucero, Jr., Pablo Lucero, and Antonio Tenorio were lessees of market stalls in the Pasig Public Market under Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983. In 1993, the Pasig municipal government renovated the market and enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, which prescribed new rules and regulations for market stall occupancy, including the submission of new application forms and a performance bond. The petitioners refused to comply with the new ordinance, leading to a dispute over their continued lease of the stalls. Procedural History: The City Government of Pasig filed an ejectment case against the petitioners in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for their failure to comply with Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, specifically for not paying the required performance bond and rental fees since January 1994. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, dismissing the complaint. The City Government appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which reversed the MTC decision, ordering the petitioners to vacate the stalls and pay rental arrearages and attorney's fees. The petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed their appeal for lack of merit and denied their motion for reconsideration. The Petition: The petitioners are now before the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari, primarily assailing the CA's decision and arguing that they possess a vested right to their market stalls based on their 1983 lease contracts, which they contend could not be impaired by the subsequent 1993 ordinance. They claim their refusal to comply with the new ordinance was justified and that the city government improperly refused their rental payments. The core issue presented is whether the petitioners have a vested right to the market stalls that is protected from the exercise of the city government's police power through the enactment of new regulations.
Issue(s)
Can petitioners claim a vested right to the market stalls they were occupying by virtue of their lease contracts under Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983? Was the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, a valid exercise of police power that could impair the existing lease contracts?
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, and ruling that petitioners do not have a vested right to the market stalls.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether petitioners can claim a vested right to the market stalls: The Court held that petitioners cannot claim a vested right to the market stalls. A vested right is defined as a right that has become the property of a particular person as a present interest, which is unalterable, absolute, complete, and unconditional. The lease contracts under Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983, did not grant petitioners irrefutable rights to the market stalls; rather, they were mere grantees of a privilege to occupy and operate such booths. Their possession and use of these facilities could not be characterized as fixed and absolute, meaning they did not possess any vested right. What they had was a license to occupy and operate particular stalls over a period of time, which is not a vested right. On the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, as an exercise of police power: The Court ruled that the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993, repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983, was a valid exercise of the Sanggunian's authority in the exercise of police power to regulate the enjoyment of the privilege to lease market stalls. The lease and occupation of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege governed by laws and ordinances, always subject to the police power of the city government. The operation of a public market is imbued with public interest, and the 1983 lease contracts contained an implied reservation of the police power. This power could be exercised to change or abrogate contract provisions for the protection of the general welfare, and such an act does not violate the non-impairment clause, which is subject to the paramount police power.
Main Doctrine
The lease and occupation of a stall in a public market is not a right but a statutory privilege governed by laws and ordinances, and is always subject to the police power of the city government, which can regulate or abrogate such privileges for the protection of the general welfare, without violating the non-impairment clause.