Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (petitioner Committee) was created to inventory behest loans, identify responsible parties, and recommend actions for recovery. The Committee investigated a loan transaction between Bayview Plaza Hotel, Inc. (BPHI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), finding it to be a behest loan due to being undercollateralized and BPHI being undercapitalized. Specific findings included DBP dropping a deficiency claim against the heirs of Esperanza Zamora and a reduction in Universal Hotels and Tourism Development Corporation's (UHTDC) obligation upon a request approved by President Ferdinand Marcos via a marginal note. 2. Procedural History: On June 11, 1997, the petitioner Committee filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Aniceto Evangelista, Julio Macuja, Gregorio Licaros, Anos Fonacier, Mariano Zamora, and Esperanza Zamora for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019. The Ombudsman, in an Order dated September 30, 1997, dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, citing that the offenses prescribed ten years after their commission in 1967, 1978, and 1977, respectively. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 6, 1998. 3. The Petition: The petitioner Committee filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse the Ombudsman's dismissal orders, arguing that the offenses had not prescribed because the nature of behest loans concealed the unlawful acts, necessitating the application of the "discovery rule" and the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code. They contended that the prescriptive period should commence from the discovery of the behest loan's nature, not from the commission of the acts.
Issue(s)
Whether the offenses charged under Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 have prescribed. Whether the prescriptive period for behest loan cases should be reckoned from the date of commission or the date of discovery, considering the application of the "discovery rule" in cases involving public officials and complex transactions. Whether the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription, and the propriety of the remedy sought by the petitioner.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for having been rendered moot and academic. The Court noted that the proper remedy should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not Rule 45. However, the Court found that the issue of prescription had already been settled in a prior case (G.R. No. 130140) involving the same petitioner and the Ombudsman, where the Court ruled that the prescriptive period for behest loan cases should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof. Furthermore, the Ombudsman subsequently conducted the preliminary investigation in OMB-0-97-1059, rendering the petition moot and academic. The Ombudsman later dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, which was not the subject of the instant petition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription for offenses under Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019: The Court reiterated its ruling in G.R. No. 130140, holding that for offenses involving behest loans, where the unlawful nature of the transactions may not be immediately apparent and requires diligent investigation, the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the date of its commission. This is consistent with People v. Duque. On the issue of the prescriptive period and the "discovery rule" in behest loan cases: The "discovery rule" is particularly applicable when public officials connive with beneficiaries, making it difficult for the State to discover the violations at the time the transactions were made. The Court emphasized that if the violation of a special law is not known at the time, prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof. On the issue of the Ombudsman's discretion and the propriety of the remedy, and the mootness of the case: While the petitioner Committee erroneously filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court addressed the substantive issues. The petition was found to be moot and academic because the issue of prescription had been resolved in G.R. No. 130140, and the Ombudsman had conducted the preliminary investigation sought by the petitioner. The subsequent dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause further solidified the mootness.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing an Ombudsman's dismissal order on the ground of prescription should have been filed as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, if the issue of prescription has already been settled in a prior case with similar facts, and the Ombudsman has subsequently conducted the preliminary investigation, the case becomes moot and academic.