Masikip v. City of Pasig
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land. The Municipality of Pasig, through Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993, intended to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property for "sports development and recreational activities" or "to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." Petitioner objected, stating the expropriation was unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, and that the area was insufficient for the stated purpose. Procedural History: Respondent filed a complaint for expropriation. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing lack of genuine necessity, arbitrary selection of property, and defects in the complaint. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the Motion to Dismiss, finding a genuine necessity for the property for sports and recreational activities and appointed commissioners to determine just compensation. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via certiorari, which dismissed the petition, affirming the RTC's order. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the CA's decision and resolution, arguing that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss, claiming there was no evidence of genuine necessity or compliance with prerequisites for eminent domain.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property for public use. Whether respondent City of Pasig established a genuine necessity for the expropriation of petitioner’s property for public use. Whether respondent City of Pasig complied with all conditions precedent for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, and ordered the dismissal of the complaint for expropriation filed by the City of Pasig.
Ratio Decidendi
On the procedural issue regarding the Motion to Dismiss: The Court held that under Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court (then in effect), a motion to dismiss in an expropriation case serves as the responsive pleading that puts in issue the plaintiff's right to expropriate. Therefore, it does not hypothetically admit the facts alleged in the complaint. The trial court should have set the case for reception of evidence to determine the necessity of the taking, rather than summarily finding public use and appointing commissioners. The Court clarified that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires an answer, cannot be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the petitioner. On the substantive issue of genuine necessity: The Court reiterated that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity of a public character. Applying this standard, the Court found that the City of Pasig failed to establish such necessity. The Certification from the Barangay Council indicated the intended beneficiary was a private homeowners' association seeking its own private playground, not the general public. Furthermore, the existence of Rainforest Park, a fully operational sports and recreational facility available to all Pasig residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan, negated the claim of genuine necessity for the expropriation of petitioner's property. The Court emphasized that the right to own property is fundamental and courts must protect it unless the requisite of genuine necessity is clearly established. On compliance with conditions precedent: While not explicitly detailed as a separate issue in the ratio, the Court's finding that the purpose was not clearly and categorically public and that genuine necessity was not shown implicitly addresses the compliance with conditions precedent. The Court noted that the intended beneficiary was a private association, and the stated purpose was not demonstrably for public use, thus failing to meet the requirements for the exercise of eminent domain under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Main Doctrine
The exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit requires a genuine necessity for public use, which must be clearly established and cannot be presumed. The existence of alternative facilities for the intended purpose can negate such necessity.