Manansan v. Republic
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns the expropriation of two parcels of land located in Sampaloc, Manila, owned by Agus Development Corporation (ADC) and Feliciano G. Manansan, for the construction of the Trinidad Tecson Elementary School. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), initiated the expropriation proceedings, valuing the property at P884,830.00 initially, and later amending the complaint to P904,830.00. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) was also impleaded due to a mortgage on the property by ADC. Procedural History: The Republic filed its complaint for expropriation on April 17, 1979. A writ of possession was issued on January 16, 1981, after the Republic deposited P90,483.00 with PNB, which was subsequently used to construct the school. Disagreements arose regarding the proper deposit and the determination of just compensation. The trial court initially fixed the provisional value at P904,830.00 and later appointed commissioners to determine the just compensation. The City Assessor and City Treasurer reported a valuation of P15,893,111.00, while Asian Appraisal Company, Inc. (AACI) reported P8,183,000.00 for Manansan's lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment on January 17, 1996, fixing the fair market value at P2,200.00 per square meter, totaling P6,642,483.00 for ADC and P1,304,072.50 for Manansan. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC decision with modification, ordering the payment of legal interest from January 16, 1981. The Petition: Petitioner Feliciano G. Manansan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He raises three main issues: (1) whether evidence not formally offered or admitted can be considered by the CA in determining the date for just compensation; (2) whether just compensation can be based solely on the trial court's arbitrary halving of a 1993 BIR Zonal Valuation as an approximation for the 1979 taking; and (3) whether attorney's fees are allowable in this expropriation case. Manansan argues that the valuation should be based on competent evidence, specifically favoring the AACI appraisal, and that the trial court's method of halving the valuation was speculative. He also contends he is entitled to attorney's fees due to the protracted litigation.
Issue(s)
Whether evidence not formally offered nor admitted may be considered by the Court of Appeals in determining the date when just compensation should be based. Whether the just compensation for a property may be based solely on the trial court's exercise of halving a 1993 BIR Zonal Valuation as the basis for just compensation in approximation of the 1979 date of taking. Whether attorney's fees are allowed in expropriation proceedings in light of the circumstances of the case.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, affirming the CA decision with modification. The case was remanded to the trial court with the order to reconstitute or designate a new panel of commissioners to assess the fair market value of the petitioner's property as of 1979, and to render judgment on the just compensation in due course. No costs were awarded.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of evidence not formally offered: The Court ruled that the petitioner raised the issue of the inadmissibility and lack of probative weight of the City Treasurer's certification for the first time before the Supreme Court. The well-entrenched rule is that a party is proscribed from raising issues not raised in the lower courts. Furthermore, the Court noted that the regularity and validity of the deposit were implicitly passed upon by the RTC when it granted the writ of possession, and the petitioner never assailed this order. The Court found no dispute that the deposit was made, although in the name of the City Treasurer, not the owners. On the issue of the basis for just compensation: The Court agreed with the petitioner that the trial court erred in arbitrarily halving the assessment of the City Treasurer and City Assessor based on 1995 BIR Zonal Values. The Court reiterated that the value of the property must be determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. In this case, the complaint was filed on April 17, 1979, and the writ of possession was issued on January 10, 1981. The commissioners' reports were based on 1995 data, a significant difference from the relevant period. The Court found the trial court's method of halving the valuation to be speculative, arbitrary, and a grave abuse of discretion. Just compensation requires a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, considering all relevant factors. Since the commissioners failed to base their assessment on the correct period, the trial court should have directed them to revise their reports, appointed new commissioners, or required parties to adduce competent evidence for the 1979 valuation. The Court found no other recourse but to remand the case for proper determination. On the issue of attorney's fees: The Court affirmed the CA's ratiocination that attorney's fees are not automatically awarded in every expropriation case. The Court distinguished the present case from Amigable v. Cuenca, where the government occupied property without expropriation proceedings. In this case, the expropriation was initiated by the government, and the circumstances did not warrant the award of attorney's fees as part of just compensation.
Main Doctrine
The fair market value of expropriated property must be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint or the date of the taking, whichever comes first. Courts cannot arbitrarily halve valuations or base them on speculations; competent evidence is required. Attorney's fees are not automatically awarded in expropriation cases.