Bernas v. Sovereign Ventures
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns conflicting titles to a parcel of land in Quezon City. Petitioner Jose A. Bernas is the registered owner under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 336663. Respondent Sovereign Ventures, Inc. claims ownership of the same property, presenting multiple TCTs in its name (N-138316, N-138317, N-138318, N-14190, N-145202, N-1452208, and N-1452209). 2. Procedural History: Sovereign Ventures, Inc. filed a Petition for Quieting of Title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Quezon City, seeking to prevent the annotation of notices of lis pendens on its titles, which would prejudice its plans to sell the property. The RTC issued a status quo order and a temporary restraining order. Petitioner Bernas moved to dismiss, alleging lack of notice of raffle. The RTC denied this motion, and subsequent motions for reconsideration were also denied. Bernas then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. Bernas's prior petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 125058 and G.R. No. 125632) were also dismissed. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Jose A. Bernas seeks review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the September 14, 1999 Decision and March 7, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Bernas argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, by issuing the status quo order and preliminary injunction without proper notice of raffle to him. He contends the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case due to this alleged lack of notice. The Supreme Court is asked to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo prior to the filing of the complaint and restraining them from causing the annotation of lis pendens on the titles of the subject property; and whether the denial of a motion to dismiss is properly assailed through a petition for certiorari. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the alleged lack of notice of raffle to the petitioner; and whether the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion and the propriety of certiorari: The Court emphasized the basic rule that when a motion to dismiss is denied by the trial court, the proper remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but an appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every interlocutory ruling but is resorted to only to correct grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order, which is under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded before final judgment. The petitioner's repeated filing of similar petitions was noted, and he was warned against future similar actions. On the issue of jurisdiction and notice of raffle, and voluntary submission to jurisdiction: The Court reiterated the requirements under Administrative Circular No. 20-95 (now Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) for raffling cases involving applications for TRO or preliminary injunction. These prerequisites include notice to the adverse party and the raffle being conducted in their presence, preceded or accompanied by service of summons. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court complied with this rule, as evidenced by the records showing a notice of raffle dated February 5, 1996, which was served and acknowledged by Glenda Jamora at petitioner's address stated in the respondent's petition. The trial court cannot be faulted for sending the notice to the address provided in the initiatory pleading. The Court affirmed the trial court's finding that petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction. The records showed that petitioner filed several pleadings and participated in hearings, including an Omnibus Motion assailing the restraining order and a motion to dismiss the case. These actions constitute voluntary appearance and submission to the court's authority, thereby conferring jurisdiction over his person.
Main Doctrine
A court acquires jurisdiction over a person through valid service of summons or voluntary appearance. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and the proper remedy is to appeal after a decision has been rendered, not a petition for certiorari, unless there is grave abuse of discretion.