De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners entered into a contract to sell with Pasig Realty and Development Corporation for a parcel of land. They paid the down payment and several monthly amortizations, but subsequently defaulted on payments due to alleged failure by the developer to develop the subdivision. The developer subsequently cancelled the contract and forfeited the payments made. Procedural History: Petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which dismissed their complaint and declared the cancellation of the contract and forfeiture of payments valid. This decision was affirmed by the HLURB Board of Commissioners and subsequently by the Office of the President (OP). A motion to set aside the OP's order of finality, arguing improper service of the decision, was denied by the OP. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Office of the President. The Supreme Court noted that the proper remedy should have been a petition for review under Rule 45, but treated the petition as such. The Court found the petition to be procedurally defective, including being filed beyond the prescribed period and lacking necessary attachments. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the substantive arguments, upholding the validity of the contract cancellation and forfeiture of payments based on the contract terms and Republic Act No. 6552, and affirming the findings of substantial compliance by the developer.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy. Whether the service of the Office of the President's decision dated October 1, 1997, upon petitioners' counsel of record was valid and binding. Whether the cancellation of the contract to sell and the forfeiture of payments made were valid and in accordance with law, and whether PD 957 applies. Whether the petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court was filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari. The petition was not only replete with procedural defects but also failed to proffer merit in its substantive aspect. The cancellation of the contract to sell and the forfeiture of payments were valid and in accordance with RA 6552 and the contract to sell.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy: The Supreme Court held that petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 when the proper remedy to reverse or modify a judgment, even if alleging grave abuse of discretion, is an appeal under Rule 45. Certiorari is a special civil action resorted to only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court treated the petition as a petition for review under Rule 45 because it was filed within 15 days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, but emphasized that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. The Supreme Court also found that the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was filed beyond the prescribed 60-day period. The period commenced on April 11, 2000, when petitioners' counsel received the OP's resolution, making the deadline June 10, 2000. The petition was filed only on September 8, 2000. The Court also noted the failure to attach the prescribed copies of pleadings and documents, a violation of Rule 65. On the validity of service and finality of judgment: The Court affirmed the Office of the President's (OP) resolution, stating that proper service of the OP's decision dated October 1, 1997, upon petitioners' counsel of record, Atty. Gonzales, could be presumed due to his failure to give proper notice of his change of address. This service was binding upon the petitioners. The Court reiterated the principle that service at the lawyer's old address should be considered valid if the lawyer moved without informing the court. Consequently, the OP's decision became final and executory. On the validity of the rescission and forfeiture, and the applicability of PD 957: The Supreme Court found that the rescission of the contract to sell and the consequent forfeiture of payments were in accordance with the contract itself and RA 6552. Petitioners defaulted in paying several monthly amortizations, with only about 15 out of 60 monthly installments settled. Section 4 of RA 6552 grants a grace period of not less than sixty days for payment of installments when less than two years of installments have been made. Failure to pay within this grace period allows the vendor to cancel the contract 30 days after receipt of the notice of cancellation. Paragraph 6 of the contract to sell also granted the vendor the option to cancel and forfeit payments upon failure to pay within 60 days from the due date. The Court noted that PRDC opted to cancel the contract on January 18, 1989, and thirty days thereafter, the contract was cancelled and payments forfeited, which was in compliance with the law and the contract. The Court ruled that petitioners could not seek protection under PD 957, which provides for non-forfeiture of payments when a vendee desists from further payment due to the developer's failure to develop the subdivision. An ocular inspection report showed substantial compliance by the corporation regarding the subdivision's development, a finding the Court saw no reason to disturb. On the timeliness of the petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court: This issue is addressed in the first ratio point.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal under Rule 45 or Rule 43. Furthermore, service of judgment upon the counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the negligence or mistake of the counsel binds the client. The failure of a counsel to inform the court of a change of address does not invalidate service made at the old address.