GSP Manufacturing Corporation v. Cabanban
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Paulina Cabanban was employed by petitioner GSP Manufacturing Corporation as a sewer from February 7, 1985, until her alleged termination on March 1, 1992. Cabanban filed a complaint against GSP and its representative, Charo Apacible, for illegal dismissal, alleging she was terminated because her daughter worked for a competitor. The petitioners, in defense, claimed Cabanban abandoned her work on March 14, 1992, and that this was reported to the Department of Labor and Employment. Procedural History: The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Cabanban, finding GSP guilty of illegal dismissal. This decision was appealed by GSP to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 10, 1995, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter's decision in its entirety. GSP then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the NLRC's findings. The Petition: Petitioners GSP Manufacturing Corporation and Charo Apacible filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. They argued that the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, which affirmed the labor arbiter's conclusions, were arbitrarily arrived at, as they were based solely on statements made by the respondent in her position paper affidavit. The Supreme Court, however, found the petition to be without merit, reiterating that factual findings of the NLRC, when consistent with the labor arbiter's, are binding on the Court, and that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with abandonment of employment.
Issue(s)
Whether the findings of fact of the NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. Whether respondent abandoned her employment, considering the requirement of notice to return to work and the implications of filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. Whether respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal was filed within a reasonable time.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the binding nature of factual findings: The factual findings of the NLRC, especially when in agreement with those of the labor arbiter, are deemed binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. The Court will only intervene if such findings are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in their evaluation of the evidence. In this case, the Court found no such arbitrariness. On abandonment of employment and its inconsistency with filing a complaint: Abandonment requires a deliberate, unjustified refusal by the employee to perform employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work, even after notice to return, does not equate to abandonment. Crucially, the records were bereft of proof that petitioners furnished respondent with a notice to return to work, a necessary element to establish abandonment. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of abandonment of employment. An employee who actively protests their dismissal through legal channels cannot logically be considered to have abandoned their work. The act of filing the complaint serves as proof of the employee's desire to return to work, thereby negating any suggestion of abandonment. On the timeliness of the complaint: The petitioners' claim that the complaint was an "afterthought" due to its filing a considerable time after the supposed abandonment was without merit. Citing Pare v. NLRC, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that respondent had four years within which to institute her action for illegal dismissal. Compared to the six months in the cited case, respondent's filing after 84 days was not unreasonably long.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with abandonment of employment, as it demonstrates the employee's desire to return to work. Mere absence, without proof of notice to return, does not constitute abandonment.