Copuyoc v. De Sola
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Erlinda de Sola (respondent) filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with Injunction against Mario L. Copuyoc (petitioner) over a property in Xavierville, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Respondent claimed ownership via TCT No. 87569, acquired on June 7, 1993, and alleged prior possession since then. Petitioner held a Contract to Sell dated September 6, 1995, with Bank of Commerce (BOC) and claimed lawful possession, asserting respondent's title was forged and the property described therein was in Tandang Sora, not Xavierville. Procedural History: The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed respondent's complaint, finding no forcible entry as the properties in the titles were not the same. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC, ordering petitioner to vacate, ruling that the properties were identical and respondent had prior possession. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in holding respondent had priority of possession, in considering tax declarations presented for the first time on appeal, and in not finding conclusive the report that the properties in the parties' titles were not located in the same place.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent had priority of possession over the property. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of tax declarations presented for the first time on appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding conclusive the report on the non-identity of the properties described in the parties' respective titles.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated April 30, 2001, and the Regional Trial Court's Decision dated October 19, 1998, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 22, 1997, rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, is REINSTATED. This is without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No. Q-97-30333, entitled "Bank of Commerce v. Erlinda de Sola."
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of priority of possession: The Court held that the petitioner has prior possession of the property. While respondent's Deed of Sale was dated June 7, 1993, prior to petitioner's Contract to Sell on September 6, 1995, the execution of a deed of sale is merely a prima facie presumption of delivery of possession, which is destroyed if actual possession is not obtained due to legal impediments. The records showed respondent never occupied the property from the time of sale or thereafter. Her "regular" visits, only five times in three years, did not constitute unequivocal proof of actual or physical possession, especially as they were not coupled with any actual exercise of dominion or construction of improvements. In contrast, petitioner established actual physical possession by commencing construction soon after the property was turned over to him via the Contract to Sell. The Court emphasized that in forcible entry cases, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror, and courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. On the admission of tax declarations: The Court found it erroneous for the RTC to have permitted respondent's belated submission of tax declarations in evidence. The Court reiterated that possession is the sole issue in a forcible entry case, and there was no justification for the delay in presenting such evidence. Furthermore, petitioner could not declare the property for tax purposes as it was still owned by the Bank of Commerce, and his right to possess was derived from the Contract to Sell, not ownership. On the identity of the property: The Court found a serious doubt as to the identity of the property claimed by respondent. Comparing the technical descriptions of the titles, the property in respondent's TCT No. 87569 was bounded on the North by Road Lot 8, while the property in BOC's TCT No. RT-114371 was bounded on the North by Road Lot 5. Geodetic Engineer Ernesto Erive testified that Lot 25, Block 6, Road 8 is located 200 meters away from the property bounded by Road Lot 5. Engineer Erive's projection indicated that BOC's property is in Loyola Heights along Katipunan Street, while respondent's property is in Tandang Sora, northwest of Commonwealth Avenue. The Court inclined to believe Engineer Erive's testimony over that of Mr. Benjamin Bustos, stating that the title is the conclusive proof of a property's metes and bounds, and the marked discrepancy cast serious doubt on the identity of the property. Given respondent's failure to establish her claim, including the identity of the property, her case must fail.
Main Doctrine
In forcible entry cases, the determination of prior physical possession is paramount, and a party with prior possession in time is entitled to remain in the property until lawfully ejected, irrespective of ownership claims. Mere execution of a deed of sale does not automatically confer possession if actual physical possession was not obtained due to legal impediments or lack of actual exercise of dominion.