Beluso v. Municipality of Panay
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The petitioners are landowners whose parcels of land, totaling approximately 20,424 square meters and covered by several Free Patents, became the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the Municipality of Panay. The municipality, through its Sangguniang Bayan, authorized the municipal government to commence expropriation proceedings. The petitioners contested this action, alleging that the taking was not for a genuine public use but rather for the benefit of specific individuals, was politically motivated due to their opposition to the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor, and that some purported beneficiaries had not actually signed the petition for the land, with signatures being forged or obtained through misrepresentation. Procedural History: The Municipality of Panay filed a petition for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Roxas City. The petitioners moved to dismiss the case, which the RTC denied, ruling that the expropriation was for public use and that the respondent had the right to take the property upon payment of just compensation. The petitioners filed an Answer, reiterating their previous objections. The RTC then appointed Commissioners to determine just compensation, and subsequent motions by the petitioners to hold proceedings in abeyance and for reconsideration were denied. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing denial of due process and grave abuse of discretion by the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition, holding that due process was not denied and that the purpose of the taking was indeed for public use. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: The petitioners seek review of the CA's decision, primarily arguing that the Municipality of Panay lacked the lawful power to expropriate their properties because the action was based on a mere resolution, not an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). They also contend that the prior offer to buy the property was not valid due to an inadequate price. Furthermore, they assert that the CA erred by failing to address these arguments, which were raised in their memorandum. The petitioners also maintain that they were denied procedural due process because the RTC declared the taking for public purpose without conducting a hearing to receive evidence on their claims of political motivation. The petition further argues that the CA failed to rule on their arguments regarding the lack of an ordinance and the invalid offer, despite these being properly pleaded.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Municipality of Panay has the lawful power to acquire the subject properties through eminent domain via a resolution instead of an ordinance. Whether the respondent Municipality of Panay has the lawful power to acquire the subject properties through eminent domain, given its previous offer to buy was allegedly not valid. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not discussing or ruling on the petitioners' arguments regarding the invalidity of the expropriation based on a resolution and the invalidity of the offer to buy. Whether the petitioners were denied procedural due process by the RTC when it declared the taking for public purpose without receiving evidence on the alleged political motivation.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47052 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Action No. V-6958 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Ratio Decidendi
On the requirement of an ordinance for expropriation: The Court held that Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 expressly requires that a local government unit may exercise the power of eminent domain only by "ordinance." A mere resolution, which expresses the sentiment or opinion of the municipal council, is insufficient to authorize expropriation. The Court emphasized that a resolution is temporary in nature and lacks the general and permanent character of an ordinance, which is considered a law. Therefore, the expropriation proceedings initiated by the Municipality of Panay based solely on Resolution No. 95-29 were defective. The Court acknowledged that while the point was not raised at the earliest opportunity, it is not precluded from considering matters raised for the first time on appeal in clearly meritorious situations, as in this case. The Court reiterated that LGUs cannot contravene the law conferring the power of eminent domain. On the validity of the offer to buy: The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether the previous offer to buy was valid, given its ruling on the procedural defect of using a resolution instead of an ordinance. The Court noted that the expropriation was based on a resolution, which fundamentally lacked the legal authority for such an exercise of power. Therefore, the validity of the offer became a secondary consideration once the primary requirement for the exercise of eminent domain by the LGU was found to be wanting. On the Court of Appeals' failure to discuss certain arguments: The Court found merit in the petitioners' claim that the CA failed to discuss and rule upon their arguments regarding the invalidity of the expropriation based on a resolution and the invalidity of the offer to buy. However, due to the Court's own resolution of the primary issue concerning the lack of an ordinance, a detailed discussion of the CA's omission on these specific points became less critical, as the case was being decided on a more fundamental procedural ground. On the denial of procedural due process: The Court found that the RTC's declaration that the taking was for public purpose without receiving evidence on the alleged political motivation constituted a denial of due process. The Court noted that conflicting claims regarding the purpose of expropriation, especially when involving alleged political motivations and disputed signatures, necessitate a hearing where parties have ample opportunity to prove their claims. The RTC's summary dismissal of the expropriation as being for public purpose without such a hearing was deemed an error. However, the ultimate dismissal of the case was based on the lack of an ordinance, rendering the due process issue moot in the final disposition.
Main Doctrine
A local government unit cannot authorize the expropriation of private property through a mere resolution; an ordinance is expressly required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.