Domalsin v. Valenciano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the possession of a parcel of land located at sitio Riverside, Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet. Petitioner Frisco F. Domalsin claims to have been the lawful owner and possessor of this land since 1979, having declared it for taxation purposes and introduced improvements. In August 1998, respondents Spouses Juanito and Amalia Valenciano allegedly entered the premises and began constructing a cement building without Domalsin's consent, by means of force and strategy. Domalsin protested, but the Valencianos refused to halt construction, leading to the filing of the instant case. Procedural History: Domalsin filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary injunction against the Valencianos before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tuba-Sablan. The MCTC, after trial, ruled in favor of Domalsin, declaring him the actual possessor and ordering the Valencianos to vacate and deliver possession. The Valencianos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MCTC's decision in its entirety. Subsequently, the Valencianos filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decisions of the MCTC and RTC, finding that the subject property was a road-right-of-way and thus part of public dominion, not susceptible to private acquisition or ownership. The CA also concluded that Domalsin's prior possession was not a basis for his claim against the Valencianos, as he had effectively allowed Gloria Banuca to gain possession after his house was destroyed and had not acted within the one-year prescriptive period against her. The Petition: Petitioner Frisco F. Domalsin seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the CA erred in holding that he abandoned the property and in reversing the lower courts' rulings. He contends that his prior physical possession should have been respected, and that his actions demonstrated a clear intent not to abandon the property. The petition further argues that the CA erred in finding that the action should have been filed against Gloria Banuca and that the prescriptive period had lapsed. Domalsin asserts that the case was timely filed against the Valencianos, who were the ones in actual possession and unlawfully withholding the property. He maintains that the issue of abandonment was material and that the lower courts correctly found no abandonment, thus entitling him to possession.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner Frisco F. Domalsin abandoned the property subject of the litigation; and whether the action for forcible entry was correctly filed and timely. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Municipal Circuit Court by prioritizing actual possession over prior possession. Whether the subject property, being a portion of the road-right-of-way, is susceptible to private ownership and possession; and the implications for prior possession in a forcible entry case. Final Disposition: Determination of rights given the nature of the property as public dominion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, setting aside the decisions of the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The respondents Juanito and Amalia Valenciano were ordered to remove their structure and vacate the subject land within sixty (60) days from receipt of the decision, delivering possession to the Office of the District Engineer, Benguet Engineering District, Department of Public Works and Highways.
Ratio Decidendi
On abandonment and timeliness of action: The Court found that petitioner Domalsin did not abandon the subject land. His opposition to the respondents' construction and the filing of the case were clear indicia of non-abandonment. The destruction of his house by an earthquake and its subsequent leveling by Gloria Banuca did not signify abandonment, as these were beyond his control or done by someone without right. The Court clarified that the action for forcible entry was correctly filed against the respondents, who were in actual possession at the commencement of the action, and not against Gloria Banuca, who was no longer in possession. The one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry, when stealth is involved, is counted from the time the plaintiff learned of the dispossession and demanded that the deforciant desist. Domalsin's immediate protest upon learning of the construction in August 1998 made the filing of the case on August 18, 1998, timely. On the Court of Appeals' ruling and prior possession: The Court found the Court of Appeals erred in prioritizing the respondents' actual possession over the petitioner's prior possession, solely on the ground that the parties could not own the land. While the CA correctly identified the property as public dominion, it incorrectly concluded that this rendered the issue of prior possession immaterial and that Domalsin should have sued Gloria Banuca. The Court emphasized that even if the parties cannot own the land, prior possession must still be respected in a forcible entry case, and the action was properly filed against the current possessors. On the nature of the property and ownership; and prior possession in forcible entry cases: The Court affirmed that the subject property is a portion of the road-right-of-way of Kennon Road, which is part of the public dominion. As such, it is not susceptible to private acquisition or ownership, and neither the petitioner nor the respondents can claim any right of possession over it based on ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code clearly defines properties of public dominion, including roads intended for public use. Article 530 of the Civil Code further states that only things and rights susceptible of appropriation may be the object of possession. Therefore, any claim of ownership or possession based on deeds of quitclaim, tax declarations, or prolonged occupation is invalid for property of public dominion. The Court reiterated that ejectment proceedings, such as forcible entry, are summary in nature and primarily concerned with who is entitled to the physical or material possession (possession de facto), not ownership. Regardless of title, the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by force. A party with prior possession can recover possession even against the owner, as long as they have not abandoned it. The determining factor for entitlement to possession in forcible entry is prior physical possession, not actual physical possession. Final Disposition: Despite finding that Domalsin had prior possession and that the action was timely filed, the Supreme Court ultimately set aside all lower court decisions because the subject property is part of public dominion. Neither party is entitled to own or possess it. The respondents were ordered to remove their structure and deliver possession to the DPWH, as the government has the superior right to properties of public dominion.
Main Doctrine
In forcible entry cases, prior physical possession is the determining factor, not actual physical possession, regardless of title or ownership. The action must be filed within one year from dispossession, and the prescriptive period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned of the dispossession and demanded that the deforciant desist, especially when stealth is involved. However, neither party can claim ownership or possession of a property that is part of the public dominion.