Filipino v. Macabuhay
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent F. Walter R. Macabuhay, representing Drugmakers' Laboratories, Inc., filed a complaint against petitioner Atty. Lorna Frances Filipino, then Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Administration (BFAD). The complaint alleged that petitioner solicited a loan of P110,000.00 from Drugmakers' Laboratories, Inc. in January 1993, in violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), and Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree). Respondent claimed that due to petitioner's disciplinary and supervisory authority, the company issued a check for the loan amount, which was then given to a third party, Marites L. Vilchez, at petitioner's request. Petitioner denied the allegations, asserting the transaction was between Drugmakers and Vilchez, and that Vilchez had repaid the loan. However, conflicting affidavits were submitted by Vilchez and Evangeline C. Del Mundo, a principal officer of Drugmakers, regarding the nature of the transaction and the recipient of the loan. Procedural History: The complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on October 5, 1995. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing prescription, which the Ombudsman denied. Despite petitioner's subsequent motions for a formal hearing, the Ombudsman proceeded to adjudicate the case after the submission of memoranda, finding petitioner guilty of soliciting and accepting a loan from a company with whom her office had business relations. On June 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered petitioner's dismissal from government service. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising issues of due process and lack of substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Ombudsman's decision on August 22, 2002, and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on July 3, 2003. This led to the present petition for review before the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the complaint was barred by prescription, that she was denied due process, and that the findings of the Ombudsman were not supported by substantial evidence. She contends that the Ombudsman should not have proceeded with the case given the one-year prescriptive period for filing complaints. Petitioner also asserts that she was deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard and that the evidence presented did not sufficiently establish her guilt. The petition specifically raises issues concerning the substantiality of evidence, the pursuit of formal investigation, the denial of due process, the presumption of regularity in official actions, and the applicability of Section 20 of R.A. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989).
Issue(s)
Whether the complaint is barred by prescription. Whether petitioner was denied due process. Whether there is substantial evidence showing petitioner's participation in the loan transaction.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of petitioner Atty. Lorna Frances Filipino from government service is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770, stating that the Office of the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation... if... the complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of," uses the word "may." This word, in statutory construction, is permissive and discretionary, not mandatory. Therefore, it is within the Ombudsman's discretion whether or not to proceed with an investigation even if the complaint is filed beyond the one-year period. Consequently, the complaint is not barred by prescription based on this provision. On the issue of denial of due process: The Court reiterated that due process in administrative proceedings requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence. This opportunity was afforded to the petitioner, who filed a Counter-Affidavit, a Motion to Dismiss, a Motion for Reconsideration, a Memorandum, and an Urgent Motion. The Court emphasized that trial-type hearings are not always essential in administrative cases; resolution based on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence is permissible as long as fairness is maintained. The petitioner's filing of a Memorandum after the case was deemed submitted for resolution, without reservation, constituted an implied waiver of her right to a formal hearing, as hearings were scheduled but she opted to file pleadings instead. On the issue of substantial evidence: The Court found that substantial evidence supported the Ombudsman's conclusion of petitioner's liability. Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The evidence presented, including Cash Voucher No. 36230 showing the disbursement of P110,000.00 in favor of petitioner, a signed handwritten note with petitioner's personal details and loan terms, and the testimonies of Evangeline Del Mundo and F. Walter R. Macabuhay, sufficiently established petitioner's participation. The Court found petitioner's reliance on bare denials insufficient and her initial denial of acquaintance with Vilchez contradicted by her later admission. The account of Vilchez was deemed incredible and highly suspect, making the company check issuance for personal transactions implausible.
Main Doctrine
The use of the word "may" in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) indicates that it is directory and not mandatory, granting the Ombudsman discretion whether or not to investigate a complaint filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission. Due process in administrative proceedings requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard, which is satisfied even without a trial-type hearing if parties are given a fair chance to explain their side. Filing a memorandum without reservation after a case is deemed submitted for resolution constitutes an implied waiver of the right to a formal hearing.