Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Bernardo Remigio, a seafarer, entered into a Contract of Employment with respondent C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. for its foreign principal, New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd., under the 1996 POEA SEC. While performing his duties as Musician II on board SS "Enchanted Isle," petitioner experienced severe chest pain and shortness of breath. He was confined and underwent medical evaluations abroad, which revealed probable coronary artery disease and blockages in his coronary arteries, leading to a triple coronary artery bypass surgery. He was declared "not fit for sea duty" and repatriated to Manila. Procedural History: Petitioner demanded payment of unpaid wages, sickness allowance, and permanent total disability benefits, which was refused. He filed a complaint for recovery of permanent total disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter awarded sickness allowance but denied disability benefits, citing the absence of heart ailment in the POEA SEC schedule and lack of proof of total and permanent disability. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of the CA's decision and praying for permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance, and attorney's fees.
Issue(s)
Whether heart ailment suffered during the term of the contract is compensable under the 1996 POEA SEC even if there is no proof of work-connection. Whether the concept of permanent total disability under the Labor Code applies to a seafarer's claim for disability benefits under the 1996 POEA SEC. Whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits based on the medical findings and his inability to perform his usual work.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Private respondents were held jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00, sickness allowance of US$3,428.00, and attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award, all at their peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether heart ailment suffered during the term of the contract is compensable under the 1996 POEA SEC even if there is no proof of work-connection: The Court ruled that the schedule in Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC is a Schedule of Disability or Impediment, not a list of compensable sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC, the 1996 POEA SEC does not list "Occupational Diseases." The phrase "during the term" in Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA SEC covers all injury or illness occurring within the contract's lifetime, and the injury or illness need not be shown to be work-related. This is consistent with previous rulings in Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC and Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, which held that compensability need not be dependent on whether the illness is work-connected under such contracts. The Court emphasized that stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to law or public policy have the force of law between the parties, and doubts should be resolved in favor of the seafarer. On whether the concept of permanent total disability under the Labor Code applies to a seafarer's claim for disability benefits under the 1996 POEA SEC: The Court affirmed that the Labor Code's concept of permanent total disability is applicable. The standard employment contract for seafarers is formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate to protect Filipino workers overseas, and Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC provides that all rights and obligations are governed by Philippine laws. The Court has consistently applied the Labor Code's concept of permanent total disability to seafarers' cases, citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, which held that disability should be understood not just medically but in terms of loss of earning capacity. The Court reiterated that permanent total disability means the inability to earn wages in the same or similar kind of work, or any work a person of similar mentality and attainment could do, and does not mean absolute helplessness. On whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits based on the medical findings and his inability to perform his usual work: The Court found that petitioner suffered from permanent total disability. The medical report of the company-designated physician indicated that petitioner underwent coronary bypass surgery, was "unfit" for duty for a significant period, and could only return to sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months. This period of unfitness, coupled with the fact that his usual work was as a drummer, demonstrated his inability to perform his customary job. The Court clarified that "playing drums per se requires physical exertion, speed and endurance" which petitioner, having undergone bypass surgery, was incapacitated to do. The possibility of returning to a different musical role does not negate permanent total disability, as the focus is on the inability to perform his usual work and earn therefrom for more than 120 days. The Court also dismissed the contention that his smoking habit disqualified him, stating that the employer assumes the risk of liability for pre-existing infirmities and that the employer failed to prove the smoking was the willful act directly causing the disability.
Main Doctrine
A seafarer suffering from a heart ailment during the term of employment is entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the 1996 POEA SEC, even if the ailment is not listed as an occupational disease, provided it results in the loss of earning capacity. The standard employment contract for seafarers, being imbued with public interest, is governed by its own provisions which are more liberal than the Labor Code in terms of compensability, and the concept of permanent total disability under the Labor Code, particularly the loss of earning capacity, applies.