Leyaley v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Engineer Leonardo C. Leyaley, OIC District Engineer of Mountain Province, was charged with violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code for allegedly disbursing P14,805,000.00 of public funds on May 6, 1998, within the election period preceding the May 11, 1998 national and local elections. Complainants Sario M. Malinias and Tony Oppas alleged that the disbursement of government funds during the election period is prohibited by law. Procedural History: The respondent denied the charges, asserting that the disbursed amounts were for projects awarded after public bidding before the election ban and that he had secured an exemption from the COMELEC Regional Director for these projects. The COMELEC Law Department recommended dismissal for insufficiency of evidence. However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed this, finding probable cause and directing the filing of a criminal information. The COMELEC En Banc reasoned that 'takay' or 'paquiao' projects are not considered work contracts under Section 261 (v), even if subjected to public bidding, and that the exemption for 'ongoing public works projects' did not apply as the projects were already completed before the campaign period. The COMELEC En Banc also clarified that the exemption granted by the Regional Director was for the public works ban, not the ban on disbursement of public funds. The Petition: Petitioner assailed the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions through a petition for certiorari, arguing that the COMELEC erred in not holding that 'paquiao' or 'takay' projects awarded after public bidding are exempted, that completed projects are included in the exemption for 'ongoing public works projects,' and that the COMELEC-CAR exemption covered the disbursement ban.
Issue(s)
Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against the petitioner. Whether public works projects undertaken under the 'takay' or 'paquiao' system, even if awarded after public bidding, are exempted from the prohibition against the release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds during the election period under Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code. Whether public works projects that were already completed before the campaign period are considered 'ongoing public works projects' for the purpose of exemption under Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code. Whether the exemption granted by the COMELEC-CAR covered the prohibition against the release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds; and whether the petition is moot due to the filing of Informations.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. The Court held that the issue of whether the COMELEC erred in its interpretation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code constitutes an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction, which is beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari. Furthermore, the criminal action against the petitioner had already commenced with the filing of the Informations before the Regional Trial Court, rendering the petition moot and academic as the disposition of the case now rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari and grave abuse of discretion: The Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a decision of the COMELEC will not be interfered with by the Court unless it is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion, meaning a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power. The present petition did not sufficiently allege or prove such abuse. Instead, the petitioner's arguments focused on convincing the Court that the COMELEC En Banc's interpretation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code was flawed, which pertains to errors of judgment rather than errors of jurisdiction. The function of certiorari is limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment concerning the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision. On the interpretation of Section 261 (v) regarding 'takay' or 'paquiao' projects and public bidding: The Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC En Banc's interpretation that Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly states that work undertaken under the 'takay' or 'paquiao' system shall not be considered a work contract. Therefore, the mere fact that a public bidding was conducted before awarding these projects did not change the nature of the work performed under those projects. The prohibition against the release and disbursement of public funds for such work could not be defeated by simply holding a public bidding, as the Code clearly excludes these systems from being considered work contracts. On the exemption for 'ongoing public works projects': The Court agreed with the COMELEC En Banc that the exemption under the penultimate paragraph of Section 261 (v) is applicable only to 'ongoing public works projects commenced before the campaign period.' In this case, the public works projects were already completed on January 29, 1998, which was before the campaign period. Consequently, they were no longer 'ongoing public works projects' at the time of the disbursement, making the exemption inapplicable. On the scope of the COMELEC-CAR exemption and the mootness of the petition: The Supreme Court noted that the exemption granted by the COMELEC Regional Director was specifically for 'exemption from the Public Works Ban,' not from the prohibition against the release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds. Since the petitioner was charged with violating paragraph (v) of Section 261, which pertains to the disbursement of public funds, and not paragraph (w) concerning public works construction, he could not take refuge under the alleged exemption granted by the Regional Director. The distinction between the two prohibitions was crucial in determining the applicability of the exemption. The Court also pointed out that criminal Informations had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) pursuant to the COMELEC En Banc Resolution. Citing established jurisprudence, the Court held that the preliminary investigation is terminated upon the filing of the information in court, and any disposition of the case thereafter, including dismissal or trial, rests within the sound discretion of the RTC. Therefore, the petition for certiorari seeking a review of the COMELEC's finding of probable cause had become moot and academic, as the proper disposition of the criminal cases is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
Main Doctrine
The prohibition against the release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds during the election period, as provided in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, explicitly excludes work undertaken by contract through public bidding. However, work undertaken under the 'takay' or 'paquiao' system, regardless of whether a public bidding was conducted, shall not be considered a work contract and thus falls within the prohibition. Furthermore, an exemption for 'ongoing public works projects commenced before the campaign period' does not apply to projects already completed before the campaign period.