Ong v. Alegre
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the eligibility of Francis G. Ong to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Joseph Stanley Alegre filed a petition to disqualify Francis Ong, alleging that Ong had already served three consecutive terms as mayor, thereby violating the three-term limit rule. Francis Ong had served as mayor from July 1, 1995, to June 30, 1998, and from July 1, 2001, to June 30, 2004. The controversy centered on whether his service from July 1, 1998, to June 30, 2001, should be counted as a full term, as his election for that period was contested and later nullified by a Regional Trial Court decision that came out after the term had expired. 2. Procedural History: Alegre's petition to disqualify Francis Ong was initially dismissed by the COMELEC First Division on March 31, 2004, which reasoned that Ong had not been duly elected for the 1998-2001 term. However, the COMELEC en banc reversed this decision on May 7, 2004, disqualifying Francis Ong and ordering his name removed from the list of candidates. The following day, Francis Ong's brother, Rommel Ong, was nominated as a substitute candidate and filed his certificate of candidacy. Alegre then filed a petition to deny due course to Rommel Ong's candidacy. Subsequently, COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano issued a memorandum on May 10, 2004, directing the implementation of the May 7 en banc resolution, which effectively prevented Rommel Ong's name from being included in the list of candidates. Alegre was ultimately proclaimed the winner. Francis Ong filed a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 163295) on May 12, 2004, and Rommel Ong filed his petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (G.R. No. 163354) shortly after. The two petitions were consolidated by the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: Both petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution of May 7, 2004. Francis Ong (G.R. No. 163295) argued that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying him, contending that his service during the 1998-2001 term should not be counted as a full term because his election was voided by the RTC. Rommel Ong (G.R. No. 163354) challenged the COMELEC's denial of due course to his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Francis, arguing that he should have been allowed to substitute. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether Francis Ong's assumption of office and service for the 1998-2001 mayoral term, despite the subsequent nullification of his election, constituted a full term for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Issue(s)
Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Francis G. Ong from running for mayor based on the three-term limit rule. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to Rommel G. Ong's certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Francis G. Ong.
Ruling
The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed COMELEC en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004, in SPA No. 04-048, is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the disqualification of Francis G. Ong: The Court held that Francis G. Ong was disqualified from running for mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections due to the three-term limit rule. For the rule to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) the official has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) the official has fully served three consecutive terms. The Court found that Francis was duly elected in May 1995 and May 2001, and fully served the terms from July 1, 1995, to June 30, 1998, and from July 1, 2001, to June 30, 2004. The controversy centered on the 1998-2001 term. Although the RTC declared Alegre the winner in the 1998 elections on July 4, 2001, this decision came after the term had expired and had no practical or legal effect on the service rendered. Francis was proclaimed mayor-elect in 1998, assumed office, and continuously discharged the duties of mayor for the entire 1998-2001 term. Therefore, his assumption of office and continuous service constituted "service for the full term" in contemplation of the three-term limit rule, distinguishing it from cases like Lonzanida v. Comelec where there was an involuntary severance from office and an interruption of service. The COMELEC en banc's decision to disqualify Francis was thus not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. On the denial of Rommel G. Ong's substitution: The Court affirmed the COMELEC's denial of due course to Rommel G. Ong's certificate of candidacy as a substitute. Existing COMELEC policy and jurisprudence, particularly Miranda v. Abaya, dictate that there can be no valid substitution when a candidate's certificate of candidacy has been denied due course or cancelled. Francis Ong's certificate of candidacy was denied due course by the COMELEC en banc resolution of May 7, 2004. Therefore, Rommel could not validly substitute for Francis. The Court reiterated the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that if the law enumerates specific instances where substitution is allowed, the omission of other instances implies their exclusion. A person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or denied due course is not considered a candidate and cannot be substituted. Consequently, Rommel's petition was also dismissed as moot and academic, given that the elections had already passed.
Main Doctrine
Service of a mayoral term, even if initially based on a contested proclamation that was later nullified after the term expired, counts as a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule if the official continuously discharged the duties of the office for the entire duration of that term. A substitute candidate cannot be validly substituted if the original candidate's certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled.