Cenzon v. Santos
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Vicente S. Cenzon filed four complaint-affidavits against private respondent Margarita C. Sia for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging dishonored checks issued by South Pacific Sugar Corp. (South Pacific) through Sia. The checks were dishonored due to a "stop payment order" or being "drawn against insufficient funds." Procedural History: The Makati City Prosecution Office initially recommended dismissal of the Estafa complaint and filing of informations for BP 22, with bail. On appeal, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reversed this, directing the filing of two informations for Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, recommending NO BAIL. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest. Subsequently, the RTC suspended proceedings due to a pending Motion for Reconsideration with the DOJ. Later, the public prosecutor moved to amend the informations from NO BAIL RECOMMENDED to BAIL SET AT P60,000.00 for each count, citing DOJ Department Circular No. 74. The RTC granted this amendment. The RTC denied the private prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner Cenzon filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the RTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's Orders, ruling that the offense charged is not punishable by reclusion perpetua and thus Sia is entitled to bail. The Court of Appeals denied Cenzon's Motion for Reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner Cenzon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution. He argued that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on cases decided by divisions, which he claimed could not modify or reverse an En Banc ruling (People v. Reyes). He also contended that the Court of Appeals solely relied on cases with different facts and that the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, recommending NO BAIL for Estafa involving P32,000.00 or over, should have been followed.
Issue(s)
Whether private respondent Sia, charged with Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, for issuing bouncing checks in the amounts of P91,776,970.00 and P15,840,000.00, may be granted bail as a matter of right. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the RTC's order allowing the amendment of the informations to set bail.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court allowing the amendment of the informations from NO BAIL RECOMMENDED to BAIL SET AT P60,000.00 are upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether private respondent Sia may be granted bail as a matter of right: The Court reiterated its pronouncements in People v. Panganiban and People v. Hernando, clarifying that the term "reclusion perpetua" as used in Presidential Decree No. 818, which amended Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, does not denote the prescribed penalty for the offense but merely describes the penalty actually imposed due to the amount of fraud involved. Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that all persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right before conviction by the Regional Trial Court, unless charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Since "reclusion perpetua" in PD 818 is not the prescribed penalty, the offense is bailable. The Court also noted its En Banc Resolution in Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. People, which allowed bail for Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d), as amended by PD 818, and upheld DOJ Department Circular No. 74. This circular amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide by providing for bail recommendations in such cases, specifically setting the bail at P60,000.00 when the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over, as in the present case. The Court emphasized that penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the accused, thus DOJ Circular No. 74 must be applied. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The amendment of the informations to set bail was based on the prevailing jurisprudence and the DOJ Department Circular No. 74, which was issued to guide prosecutors in recommending bail amounts in light of the Supreme Court's rulings. The Court distinguished the case of People v. Reyes, relied upon by the petitioner, noting that it involved a conviction and bail pending appeal, whereas the present case concerns the right to bail before conviction. The Court affirmed that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the later rulings and DOJ Circular No. 74, which superseded the older practices or interpretations reflected in the 2000 Bail Bond Guide. The Court reiterated that the pronouncements in Lim v. People and Poblete v. Court of Appeals further solidified the application of DOJ Department Circular No. 74 in cases of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d), as amended by PD 818.
Main Doctrine
The term "reclusion perpetua" as used in Presidential Decree No. 818, amending Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of fraud involved, and does not signify that it is the prescribed penalty for the offense, thus, persons charged with Estafa under said provision are entitled to bail as a matter of right, provided the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.