Basa, In re
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: The Attorney-General filed a petition for disciplinary action against Attorney Carlos S. Basa following his conviction for the crime of abduction with consent as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code. Basa, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands and approximately 29 years of age, was found guilty in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila and was sentenced to two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. The conviction was affirmed on appeal by the second division of the Supreme Court. Procedural History: After affirmation of the conviction, the Attorney-General moved the Supreme Court for disciplinary action under the Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, which authorizes removal or suspension of a member of the bar by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The matter was heard En Banc, with Malcolm, J., writing for the Court. Several authorities and precedents were considered in determining whether the crime involved moral turpitude and what sanction should follow. The Petition: The Attorney-General sought the removal (disbarment) of respondent from the office of lawyer. The Court was asked to determine (a) whether the respondent's conviction involved moral turpitude within the meaning of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (b) what disciplinary action the Court should impose.
Issue(s)
Whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure, section 21. What disciplinary action should the Supreme Court impose upon respondent given his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Ruling
The Court held that the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude. Applying Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, the Court ordered that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the crime involves moral turpitude: The Court reasoned that 'moral turpitude' encompasses acts done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals and that crimes of the character of abduction with consent fall squarely within this definition. The opinion cites authority, including In re Hopkins (1909) and Pollard v. Lyon (1875), to support the proposition that offenses which are inherently against good morals and accepted rules of right conduct involve moral turpitude. Applying these authorities, the Court found that the inherent nature of the offense is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct, and therefore constitutes moral turpitude. The Court emphasized the statutory language of Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, which conditions removal or suspension of a lawyer upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and concluded that the statutory threshold is met. The Court thus held that the respondent's conviction satisfies the legal requirement for disciplinary action under section 21. On the appropriate disciplinary action: The Court balanced the seriousness of the respondent's violation of the criminal law against considerations of proportionality and the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation. While recognizing that the violation cannot be lightly passed over, the Court expressed reluctance to utterly ruin a promising career and elected to exercise leniency within its disciplinary powers. Instead of ordering permanent disbarment, the Court imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law, to commence upon the respondent's discharge from prison, thereby linking the administrative sanction to the criminal penalty actually served. In reaching this disposition, the Court considered precedent and the discretionary nature of disciplinary remedies under section 21, applying principles that permit the Court to calibrate the sanction to the circumstances of the case. The Court's reasoning demonstrates that while conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude mandates disciplinary action, the precise sanction is left to the Court's judgment guided by facts and equitable considerations. Applying In re Hopkins and other cited authorities, the Court showed that disciplinary proceedings seek both to protect the public and to preserve the integrity of the profession while allowing room for measured leniency where appropriate.
Main Doctrine
A member of the bar who is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude may be removed or suspended from his office as a lawyer under Code of Civil Procedure, section 21; the crime of abduction with consent as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code involves moral turpitude.