First Women's Credit Corp. v. Perez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) and Shig Katayama filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati accusing private respondents Ramon P. Jacinto, Jaime C. Colayco, Antonio P. Tayao and Glicerio Perez of several crimes. The investigating prosecutor found probable cause to charge the private respondents for certain offenses and informations were filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. The public respondent, Hon. Hernando B. Perez, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), reviewed the matter and, by resolution dated April 29, 2002, found that there was no probable cause to prosecute the private respondents and directed the withdrawal of the informations. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice was denied on September 24, 2002. Procedural History: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74145, seeking annulment of the Secretary of Justice’s resolutions as tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In a decision dated March 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Secretary of Justice’s resolutions. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on July 11, 2005. Petitioners then filed the present petition for review with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 169026. The Petition: Petitioners sought reversal and annulment of the Court of Appeals’ decision and the Secretary of Justice’s resolutions, arguing that the Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause and that the CA erred in upholding those resolutions.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause. Whether the Secretary of Justice’s resolution directing withdrawal of informations was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Whether errors in the appreciation of evidence may be reviewed in a petition for certiorari. Whether the Executive, through the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice, has primary authority to determine probable cause.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74145 are AFFIRMED. The Secretary of Justice’s resolutions finding no probable cause and directing withdrawal of the informations are upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion: The Court explained that the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information is an executive function principally vested in the public prosecutor and ultimately in the Secretary of Justice. Judicial intervention in preliminary investigations is disfavored and the Court will not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated the definition of grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction and gave examples of what would constitute such abuse. Applying this standard to the facts and to the Secretary’s April 29, 2002 resolution, the Court found that the reasons for the Secretary’s action were clearly and sufficiently stated and did not display whimsy or grossness amounting to an evasion of duty. Consequently, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding there was no grave abuse of discretion. On Whether the Secretary of Justice’s resolution directing withdrawal of informations was tainted with grave abuse of discretion: The Court examined the Secretary’s reasons and concluded that he applied fundamental precepts of criminal law to the allegations, facts, and evidence on record. The Court held that even if the Secretary had made erroneous inferences of fact or conclusions of law, such errors were not of a character to amount to grave abuse of discretion warranting judicial nullification. The Court emphasized that grave abuse must be patent and gross and that mere error in judgment or in interpretation does not meet that standard. The disposition therefore upholds the Secretary’s discretionary judgment to direct withdrawal of the informations. On Whether errors in the appreciation of evidence may be reviewed in a petition for certiorari: The Court reaffirmed the settled rule that errors in the appreciation of evidence generally do not raise jurisdictional questions and are not susceptible to correction in a certiorari proceeding. The Court observed that petitioners’ contentions effectively reduced to disagreements over appreciation of the evidence, which cannot be remedied by certiorari absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Applying this principle, the Court found no basis to disturb the Secretary’s factual and evidentiary conclusions and therefore declined to grant relief. On Whether the Executive has primary authority to determine probable cause: The Court reiterated that the determination of probable cause in the filing of informations belongs to the prosecutorial function of the Executive and that courts should refrain from undue interference. The Court explained that this policy affords the Department of Justice latitude to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, and that judicial review on certiorari is limited to instances of grave abuse of discretion. The Court concluded that such separation of functions and deference to prosecutorial judgments was observed in the present case and justified denial of the petition.
Main Doctrine
Courts will not interfere with the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion; errors in the appreciation of evidence are generally not reviewable in certiorari.