Villamor v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: On May 13, 2004, Virginio Villamor was proclaimed the mayor of Carmen, Cebu, following the May 10, 2004 elections, defeating his opponent, Amytis De Dios-Batao. Respondent De Dios-Batao alleged illegal composition of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) and its proceedings, filing a petition to annul the proclamation on May 17, 2004. 2. Procedural History: Respondent De Dios-Batao subsequently filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City on May 24, 2004, which was initially dismissed by the RTC on June 24, 2004, for being filed one day late. However, the RTC reconsidered its dismissal on July 23, 2004, ruling that the protest was timely filed as the deadline fell on a Sunday. Petitioner Villamor appealed this reconsideration to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which dismissed the appeal on April 11, 2005. The COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration on August 5, 2005. Separately, the COMELEC dismissed the petition to annul the proclamation on May 9, 2005. 3. The Petition: This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the COMELEC's resolution and order. The petitioner argues that the RTC erred in entertaining a motion for reconsideration of its dismissal order, as such a motion is prohibited in election contests involving municipal officers. Furthermore, the petitioner contends that the RTC prematurely admitted the election protest while a pre-proclamation controversy was pending, and that the period for filing a counter-protest should not have been counted from the receipt of the COMELEC's resolution denying the annulment petition.
Issue(s)
Whether a regular court, in an election protest, can act on a motion for reconsideration from an order of dismissal when such motion is prohibited. Whether a regular court may admit an election protest prematurely when a petition for pre-proclamation controversy is still pending before the COMELEC, and if so, whether the period for filing a counter-protest can be counted from the receipt of the COMELEC resolution denying the petition for annulment of proclamation.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled and set aside the COMELEC resolutions, and reinstated the RTC Order dated June 24, 2004, dismissing the election protest.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a regular court can act on a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of an election protest when such motion is prohibited: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, agreeing with the petitioner. It cited Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, both of which explicitly state that no motion for reconsideration shall be entertained in election contests affecting municipal officers. The Court emphasized that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly within the prescribed period and manner. Since respondent filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration instead of perfecting an appeal within the five-day period after receiving the dismissal order, the motion did not toll the reglementary period. Consequently, the dismissal order became final and unappealable. The Court clarified that the rules in ordinary civil procedure do not apply in election cases except suppletorily, and in this instance, the specific provisions prohibiting motions for reconsideration left no room for such application. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prohibited motion. On the issue of whether a regular court may admit an election protest prematurely pending a pre-proclamation controversy and its effect on the period for filing a counter-protest: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court prematurely admitted the election protest. As a general rule, the filing of a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to its abandonment. This is to prevent confusion and conflict of authority, as all related questions should be decided in the case where the tribunal has already acquired jurisdiction. The Court noted that not all actions seeking annulment of proclamation suspend the period for filing an election protest. The distinction lies in the grounds. In this case, respondent's petition to annul the proclamation was based on the alleged illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings, which is an issue properly raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. However, this petition was filed on May 17, 2004, four days after petitioner's proclamation, which is considered late under COMELEC rules requiring such petitions to be filed immediately when the board begins to act or when proceedings become illegal. Therefore, the filing of this petition did not suspend the reglementary period for filing an election protest. The subsequent filing of the election protest on May 24, 2004, thus amounted to an abandonment of the earlier filed pre-proclamation controversy. Consequently, the period for filing the counter-protest also ran from the original proclamation date.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing an election protest for lack of jurisdiction is a prohibited pleading and does not toll the reglementary period for appeal. The filing of a petition to annul proclamation based on illegal composition of the board of canvassers, if filed after proclamation, constitutes abandonment of a pre-proclamation controversy and does not suspend the period for filing an election protest.