People v. Capila
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On August 9, 1993, an Information for robbery was filed against Pepito Capila y Yruma (petitioner), his brother Bonifacio Capila y Yruma, Deogenio Caparoso y Porfero, and Dimas dela Cruz y Lorena. The accused, along with two aliases, allegedly conspired to steal P1.3 million in cash and three caliber paltik firearms valued at P18,000.00 from Pilipinas Bank and Lanting Security Agency. The incident occurred at the Meralco Collection Office in Makati City. Petitioner was a security guard of Lanting Security and Watchman Agency assigned to the Meralco Collection Office. On May 9, 1992, bank employees Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio were at the office to receive cash collections amounting to P1,292,991.12. Two armed men entered, subdued the on-duty security guard Dimas dela Cruz, and robbed Arellano and Imperio of the cash and three .38 caliber revolvers. Dimas dela Cruz immediately identified petitioner as one of the robbers to Ariel Arellano and later to SPO4 Romualdo Maximo of the Makati Police. Petitioner fled to his hometown in Northern Samar, where he was arrested along with his brother and Deogenio Caparoso. P5,000.00, allegedly part of the loot, was found in petitioner's possession. SPO4 Maximo interrogated petitioner, who allegedly admitted participation and identified Dimas dela Cruz as the mastermind. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 148, Makati City, acquitted Bonifacio Capila, Deogenes Caparoso, and Dimas dela Cruz, but found petitioner Pepito Capila guilty of robbery, sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) to ten (10) years. He was also ordered to pay P18,000.00 to Lanting Security Agency and P1,292,991.12 to Pilipinas Bank. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the trial court erred in admitting Dimas dela Cruz's statement identifying him as one of the robbers, as he was denied due process for not being able to cross-examine Dimas, who did not testify. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The Petition: The fundamental issue is whether the prosecution proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue(s)
Whether the statement of Dimas dela Cruz identifying petitioner as one of the robbers, made to Ariel Arellano and SPO4 Maximo, is admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae despite Dimas not testifying in court. Whether petitioner's flight to his hometown and failure to testify constitute an admission by silence and evidence of guilt. Whether the prosecution proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment finding petitioner Pepito Capila y Yruma guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of Dimas dela Cruz's statement: The Court held that the statement of Dimas dela Cruz identifying petitioner as one of the robbers is admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae. The Court reiterated the requisites for res gestae: (1) the principal act is a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous and made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, during or immediately after the occurrence; and (3) the statement concerns the occurrence and its attending circumstances. The robbery was a startling occurrence. Dimas dela Cruz identified petitioner immediately after the incident to Ariel Arellano and later to SPO4 Maximo, before he had the opportunity to fabricate a story. Dimas personally knew petitioner as they worked for the same agency and were assigned to the same office. The statement directly concerned the robbery. The Court cited Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals to support the admissibility of such statements even if the declarant did not testify, as long as they fall under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, SPO4 Maximo's testimony regarding Dimas' statement was not hearsay. On petitioner's flight and failure to testify: The Court found that petitioner's failure to testify to rebut the damaging testimonies of the prosecution witnesses constitutes an admission by silence, as provided under Section 32, Rule 130 of the New Rules on Evidence. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true, and when it is proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. Furthermore, petitioner's flight to Samar after the commission of the crime is an indication of guilt. Flight is a circumstance that may be considered as evidence of guilt, as it suggests a consciousness of guilt and an attempt to evade apprehension. On whether the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt: Based on the admissible statement of Dimas dela Cruz under the res gestae exception, petitioner's admission by silence, and his flight from the scene of the crime, the Court concluded that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence presented, when taken together, sufficiently proved his participation in the commission of the robbery.
Main Doctrine
Statements made by a person during a startling occurrence or immediately before, during, or subsequent thereto, concerning the circumstances thereof, are admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae, provided the requisites of spontaneity and relation to the occurrence are met. The failure of an accused to testify and rebut prosecution evidence can be considered an admission by silence, and flight from the scene of the crime is an indication of guilt.