Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Picop Resources, Inc. – Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc. – Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL) is the labor union representing the rank-and-file employees of respondent PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP). Due to financial and operational problems, PICOP declared a temporary shutdown in 1997. NAMAPRI-SPFL filed a Notice of Strike, and subsequently, its members staged a strike on January 11, 1998, barricading company premises. PICOP filed a Petition for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with the NLRC, which issued a TRO, but the union defied it. PICOP then filed a complaint to declare the strike illegal. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) assumed jurisdiction, ordered the lifting of the picket and return to work, but required PICOP to accept employees under previous terms. PICOP later announced a permanent shutdown of its plywood plant effective March 31, 1998, leading to another strike by NAMAPRI-SPFL members. PICOP dismissed the remaining workers and permanently closed the plant. Procedural History: The SOLE issued an Order on September 9, 1999, declaring the temporary shutdown and lay-offs legitimate, the permanent retrenchment valid, the impeachment of the Union President illegal, dismissing certain union demands, and ordering PICOP to pay separation benefits to retrenched workers. It also directed the return to work of striking workers pending resolution of the illegality of the strike. Both parties filed Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied in an Order dated November 5, 1999, with a modification clarifying the return-to-work directive. NAMAPRI-SPFL and PICOP filed separate petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing these Orders. Despite the pendency of these petitions, NAMAPRI-SPFL sought a writ of execution from the SOLE, which was granted on July 5, 2000. A Writ of Execution was issued on November 20, 2000, leading to the garnishment of PICOP's funds. PICOP then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction with the CA, which issued a Resolution on March 7, 2001, enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution. NAMAPRI-SPFL's motion for reconsideration was denied, and the CA granted a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of PICOP in a Resolution dated July 4, 2001. The Petition: Aggrieved by the CA's Resolutions, NAMAPRI-SPFL filed the instant petition, styling it as both a Rule 45 appeal and a Rule 65 special civil action, seeking to overturn the CA's March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 Resolutions.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 Resolutions. Whether the petition, styled as both a Rule 45 appeal and a Rule 65 special civil action, is the proper procedural remedy.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. It held that the petition was procedurally flawed, as a Rule 45 appeal is not the proper remedy for assailing interlocutory orders. Even if treated as a Rule 65 petition, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court also noted that subsequent rulings affirmed the CA's actions, rendering the petition moot and academic.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals and the mootness of the petition: The Court held that even assuming the petition was filed under Rule 65, it must fail because the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and such discretion must be exercised capriciously and whimsically to warrant certiorari. The Court emphasized that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the Court found that petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL failed to demonstrate any such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment by the CA. The Court noted that the monetary award to the union members was secured by the P50 million bond posted by PICOP, and the resort to Rule 45 was premature as the CA case had not yet been decided on the merits. The Court pointed out that the CA's March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 Resolutions, which enjoined the enforcement of the SOLE's order, were maintained by the CA in its March 22, 2001 Decision in CA G.R. SP No. 60586. This decision annulled and set aside the July 5, 2000 Order of the SOLE. Furthermore, this CA decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in NAMAPRI-SPFL-Avila Group v. NAMAPRI-SPFL-TRUGILLO GROUP on September 12, 2001, which annulled the SOLE's order. Consequently, the legality of the CA's questioned resolutions had been upheld, rendering the present petition moot and academic. On the procedural issue of the appropriate remedy: The Court clarified that a petition for review under Rule 45 is an appeal from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of a case, and it is not the appropriate remedy for assailing interlocutory orders or provisional remedies. The assailed March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 CA Resolutions were interlocutory orders. The Court reiterated that when an interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus under Rule 65 is the proper recourse. However, the Court found that the petitioner's attempt to use both Rule 45 and Rule 65 in a single pleading was an "unorthodox strategy" and that a party cannot file both types of petitions simultaneously as they pertain to different remedies with distinct applications. The Court cited Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. CA and Mercado v. Court Appeals to emphasize that these remedies are mutually exclusive.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review under Rule 45 is not the appropriate remedy to assail interlocutory orders of the Court of Appeals; such challenges should be brought via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Furthermore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court, and absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court will not interfere.