Government Service Insurance System v. Pacquing
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed ₱4,250,000 from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured by mortgages. GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the properties upon Bengson's default. Bengson filed an action to annul the foreclosure, which the RTC declared void, ordering GSIS to restore the properties and pay damages. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification, remanding for reception of evidence on costs of suit and property replacement value. The CA decision became final on February 10, 1988. Procedural History: Upon GSIS's failure to return the properties, the RTC ordered GSIS to pay Bengson the equivalent value. Bengson presented evidence on costs of suit, and on April 6, 1995, the RTC ordered GSIS to pay ₱31 million as costs of suit, which became final on April 24, 1995. GSIS filed an omnibus motion alleging its counsel was AWOL and unaware of the order. Respondent Judge Vicente A. Pacquing dismissed this motion, treated as a petition for relief, on January 16, 1997. GSIS's motion for reconsideration was denied on April 23, 1998. GSIS filed a certiorari action in the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 47669) assailing the denial, which the CA dismissed for being filed out of time. While this CA petition was pending, respondent judge issued an alias writ of execution on December 16, 1998, ordering GSIS to pay ₱31 million. Respondent Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, as sheriff, levied on GSIS's shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation (SMC) worth ₱6.2 million, which were later sold at auction to Bengson. GSIS moved to quash the writ, claiming exemption under Section 39 of RA 8291. Respondent judge denied this, stating only funds necessary for actuarial solvency were exempt. GSIS's motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: GSIS filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 136874) questioning the garnishment and sale. The case was referred to the CA and consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 47669. Both petitions were dismissed by the CA. GSIS questioned the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 via G.R. No. 137448, and the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 51131 (re-docketed from G.R. No. 136874) via G.R. No. 141454, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the CA in upholding the trial court's actions. GSIS also filed this administrative complaint against respondent judge and Atty. Bañez for ignorance of the law, bias, partiality, and violation of RA 8291, alleging deliberate disregard of RA 8291 and malicious scheme.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law, bias, and partiality in issuing the alias writ of execution and denying GSIS's motion to quash. Whether respondent Atty. Bañez is liable for executing the writ of execution. Whether the administrative complaint is the proper remedy for the alleged errors of the respondent judge.
Ruling
The administrative complaint is DISMISSED. The Supreme Court adopted the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and the investigating Justice Barrios, finding no basis to hold the respondents administratively liable.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged ignorance of the law, bias, and partiality of respondent judge: The Court held that for a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent, not merely an error in interpretation or application of law. Such acts must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice, or dishonesty. The Court found that GSIS's complaint stemmed from an honest divergence of opinion and that no evidence of malice or bad faith was presented. The issuance of the alias writ of execution was not precipitate, as it was issued more than three years after the order awarding costs of suit became final. The Court reiterated that once a judgment becomes final, the issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty. Even if the judge erred, administrative sanction is not warranted absent malice or bad faith. For allegations of bias and partiality, GSIS failed to demonstrate that the judge's decisions came from extrajudicial sources or improper considerations, as opposed to his study of the case. The Court noted that its prior decisions in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454 nullified the judge's orders to give GSIS a chance to seek redress due to its counsel's gross negligence, not because the judge's orders were erroneous or tainted with malice. On the liability of respondent Atty. Bañez: The Court found no basis to hold Atty. Bañez liable for executing the writ. Executing a judgment is a difficult phase of proceedings, and sheriffs must act with dispatch. Atty. Bañez merely carried out a ministerial duty and had no discretion to implement or not implement the writ. His actions were not characterized by undue haste, but rather by the necessity of executing a final and executory judgment. On the propriety of the administrative complaint: The Court emphasized that an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting perceived errors of a judge when judicial remedies are available. Administrative actions against judges should not be considered complementary or suppletory to, or substitutes for, judicial remedies. The Court's prior decision nullifying the judge's orders was to allow GSIS to seek redress from its counsel's negligence, not to validate the administrative complaint against the judge.
Main Doctrine
For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent, and motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. Mere error in interpretation or application of law, absent malice or bad faith, does not warrant administrative sanction. Similarly, allegations of bias and partiality require clear and convincing evidence of decisions stemming from extrajudicial sources or improper considerations, not merely from the judge's study of the case.