Aliño v. Adove
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Defendants-appellants sold a parcel of land to plaintiff-appellee Patricio Aliño on May 14, 1906, with the right to repurchase, for P1,573. No period for redemption was stipulated in the deed of sale. Procedural History: Plaintiff-appellee filed an amended complaint praying for the confirmation of a preliminary injunction, declaration of exclusive ownership over the land, and damages. Defendants-appellants alleged they tendered the repurchase price on May 14, 1915, before the expiration of the legal period. They further claimed an agreement with the plaintiff allowing them to use and cultivate the land after milling of sugar cane in 1916, and a subsequent offer to redeem after milling, which was refused. They deposited the repurchase price in the justice of the peace court. The lower court ruled that the period for redemption expired on May 14, 1910, making the plaintiff's title absolute by May 14, 1915. The court ordered the defendants to return the land and pay P1,325 as damages, representing half the net value of sugar cane that could have been obtained. The Petition: The defendants appealed the decision, contending that their right of redemption could be exercised within ten years from May 14, 1906, arguing that Article 1508 of the Civil Code was repealed by Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendants' right of redemption could be exercised on May 14, 1915. Whether Article 1508 of the Civil Code, regarding the period for redemption in sales with pacto de retro, was repealed by Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the defendants' right of redemption had prescribed and Patricio Aliño's title to the land had become absolute. The defendants were ordered to return the land and pay damages.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the defendants' right of redemption could be exercised on May 14, 1915: The Court held that the right of redemption in a sale with a right to repurchase, when no period is stipulated, must be exercised within four years from the execution of the contract, as provided by Article 1508 of the Civil Code. The sale in this case occurred on May 14, 1906. Therefore, the legal period for redemption expired on May 14, 1910. By May 14, 1915, the defendants' right of redemption had prescribed, and the plaintiff's title had become absolute. The Court cited previous rulings in Albert and Albert vs. Punsalan, Buencamino vs. Viceo, Alano vs. Babasa, Tuazon vs. Goduco, and Facundo vs. Macapagal and Crisostomo to support this principle. The subsequent attempt to repurchase in 1915, including the deposit of the price, did not affect the issue because the plaintiff's title was already absolute. The Court also found no novation of the original contract, as a contract that has already been consummated cannot be novated, and the proposed new contract in 1915 was not perfected due to the defendants' failure to comply with the plaintiff's conditions. On whether Article 1508 of the Civil Code was repealed by Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure: The Court found the appellants' contention untenable. Article 1508 of the Civil Code provides that the period for redemption may be conventional, not exceeding ten years, or legal, fixed at four years. Thus, there is always a period within which the right of redemption must be exercised. The Court did not explicitly state whether Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 1508, but it firmly applied Article 1508 of the Civil Code to determine the redemption period. The ruling implicitly maintains the applicability of Article 1508 of the Civil Code for sales with pacto de retro, especially when no period is stipulated, and that the legal period is four years.
Main Doctrine
In a sale with right to repurchase where no period is stipulated, the legal period for redemption is four years from the execution of the contract, as provided by Article 1508 of the Civil Code. Failure to exercise this right within the stipulated or legal period results in the vendor's title becoming absolute.