Borres Heirs v. Abela
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3376, originally adjudicated in 1929 to Faustina, Segundina, Felisa, Micaela, Maria, and Sixto Borres. Respondent Victoria Villareiz-Radjaie claims sole ownership, asserting her father, Jose Villareiz, redeemed the property and had it exclusively titled in his name in 1940, with her inheriting it. The petitioners, representing the heirs of the other Borres siblings, assert their co-ownership rights, alleging that Jose fraudulently secured the title solely in his name and that Victoria's subsequent title is also invalid. Procedural History: The Borres heirs filed a complaint for partition and accounting in 1992, seeking cancellation of Victoria's title. After Victoria was declared in default, a decision was rendered in 1995 by Judge Jose O. Alovera, then presiding over Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, ordering the cancellation of Victoria's title and declaring co-ownership. Judge Alovera retired shortly after. In 1996, Victoria filed a petition for relief, alleging lack of summons and that the 1995 decision was void as it was penned after Judge Alovera's retirement and not entered in the book of judgments. Judge Julius L. Abela, the new presiding judge, granted the petition for relief, nullified the 1995 decision and subsequent orders, and ordered the property's return to Victoria. Subsequently, Judge Abela issued orders directing Atty. Alberto Villarruz and Judge Alovera to explain their conduct, leading to their suspension from the practice of law. The Petition: The consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court were filed by the Borres heirs (G.R. No. 131023), Atty. Alberto Villarruz (G.R. No. 131505), and former Judge Jose O. Alovera (G.R. No. 131768). The Borres heirs assail Judge Abela's resolution granting the petition for relief and his order directing Atty. Villarruz to explain his alleged misconduct. Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera challenge the order suspending them from the practice of law. The petitioners argue that the 1995 decision had become final and executory, that Judge Abela lacked the authority to nullify it, and that they were denied due process in the suspension proceedings. They contend that the proper remedy for Victoria should have been an action for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, not a petition for relief.
Issue(s)
Whether Judge Abela committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief and setting aside the January 30, 1995 Decision. Whether Judge Abela committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioners Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera from the practice of law. Whether the petitions should be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the consolidated petitions. It affirmed the Resolution dated September 25, 1997, granting Victoria Villareiz-Radjaie's petition for relief, and the Orders dated October 14, 1997, and November 28, 1997, suspending Atty. Alberto Villarruz from the practice of law. The Court also affirmed the suspension of Judge Jose O. Alovera, noting that he had already been disbarred. The Temporary Restraining Orders issued in these cases were lifted, and the Regional Trial Court was directed to resume proceedings in Civil Case No. V-6186.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Judge Abela committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief and setting aside the January 30, 1995 Decision: The Court held that Judge Abela did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The January 30, 1995 Decision was void ab initio because it was penned by Judge Alovera after his retirement, when he no longer had the authority to decide cases. The Court took judicial notice of its own decision in Administrative Case No. 4748, which disbarred Judge Alovera for gross misconduct, including penning this decision after retirement. The Court reiterated the principle that a decision penned by a judge after retirement cannot be validly promulgated and is void. Such a void judgment never acquires finality and cannot be the source of any right or obligation. Therefore, the petition for relief was a proper remedy, and the periods for relief under Rule 38 were inapplicable because a void judgment is vulnerable to attack at any time. On whether Judge Abela committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera from the practice of law: The Court found that Judge Abela did not commit grave abuse of discretion. He acted pursuant to Sections 28 of Rule 138 and Section 16 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which allow the suspension of an attorney for deceit, malpractice, or gross misconduct. The Court noted that disciplinary proceedings do not require a verified complaint, as the court may act on its own motion to preserve the administration of justice. The Court found that Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera were duly notified of the charges and given opportunities to explain and participate in hearings, but they failed to do so, instead filing their petitions directly with the Supreme Court. The essence of due process was met by affording them a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The disbarment of Judge Alovera in a separate administrative case rendered the issue of his suspension moot. On the issue of hierarchy of courts: The Court acknowledged that the petitions were filed directly with the Supreme Court, violating the principle of judicial hierarchy. However, considering the peculiar circumstances and the length of time the proceedings had been pending, the Court deemed it necessary and practical to resolve the controversy to avoid further delay.
Main Doctrine
A decision penned by a judge after retirement is void and can never attain finality, rendering all proceedings founded upon it equally void. Such a void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment and can be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not require a verified complaint as the court may act on its own motion for the preservation of the administration of justice.