Salvador v. Mapa
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (the Committee), created by Administrative Order No. 13 on October 8, 1992, investigated loan transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), later Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI), and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined these loans had characteristics of behest loans, including being under-collateralized, PEMI being undercapitalized, and its officers being identified as cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos. Specifically, a foreign currency loan of $19,680,267.00 was approved and released in 1980 and 1981 despite PEMI's non-compliance with DBP's conditions. Procedural History: Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, representing the Committee, filed a sworn complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) against several respondents. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint in a Resolution dated October 9, 1997, on the ground that the offenses had prescribed. The Ombudsman's Resolution was based on the ten-year prescriptive period under R.A. 3019 (as amended by BP 195, which increased it to fifteen years) and the principle that prescription begins from the commission of the violation or discovery thereof, applying the rule that for public instruments, prescription runs from execution. The Ombudsman also noted that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61, which defined behest loans, were issued after the transactions and could be considered ex post facto laws. The Ombudsman denied the Committee's motion for reconsideration on July 27, 1998. The Petition: The Committee, through Atty. Salvador, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order.
Issue(s)
Whether the crime defined by Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019 has already prescribed at the time the Petitioner filed its complaint. Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman are SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an evaluation of the merits of the complaint against the herein respondents.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Prescription: The Court held that the prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. No. 3019, particularly those involving behest loans, should be computed from the date of discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the date of its commission. This is because, in cases involving behest loans and the alleged connivance of public officials, it is well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. The ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto was reiterated, emphasizing that the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Committee. Since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date the Committee was created, the criminal offenses had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996. The Ombudsman's concession that prescription commenced from the date of discovery, not from the registration of loan documents, further supports this conclusion. The Court noted that the Ombudsman erroneously applied the rule that prescription runs from the execution of public instruments, overlooking the discovery rule applicable in cases of concealed violations. On the Issue of Ex Post Facto Laws: The Court ruled that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws. The Ombudsman acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring these orders unconstitutional, as the Ombudsman does not have the authority to pass on the constitutionality of laws. Furthermore, an ex post facto law is defined as one that makes an act criminal which was innocent when done, aggravates a crime, changes the punishment to a greater one, or alters legal rules of evidence to the detriment of the accused. Administrative Order No. 13 merely created a committee and defined its functions, while Memorandum Order No. 61 provided a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Neither order imposes penalties or defines crimes, thus they are not penal laws and cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. The presumption of constitutionality applies, and there was no clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution to justify nullification.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. No. 3019, particularly those involving behest loans, should be computed from the date of discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the date of its commission, especially when the acts were concealed or involved connivance. Administrative Orders creating fact-finding committees and defining terms like 'behest loans' are not ex post facto laws as they are not penal in nature.