Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), created by Administrative Order No. 13, investigated loan accounts referred by the Assets Privatization Trust. Orlando S. Salvador, PCGG consultant, executed sworn statements alleging that P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon) obtained loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) without sufficient collateral and adequate capital, classifying them as behest loans. Procedural History: The Committee, upon instruction from President Ramos, filed separate complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman against various officials and stockholders of these corporations for alleged violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Ombudsman, in an Order dated July 6, 1998, dismissed these complaints, ruling that most offenses had prescribed, except for two loan transactions of Golden River in 1982, which the Ombudsman found to be sufficiently collateralized. A motion for reconsideration was denied on August 31, 1998. The Petition: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Petitioner) filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the Ombudsman's dismissal orders. Petitioner argued that the dismissal was premature, that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the motion for reconsideration as filed out of time, that consolidating the three complaints was erroneous, and that the Ombudsman failed to consider the evidence and the nature of behest loans.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints motu proprio without requiring counter-affidavits and a reply from the petitioner. Whether the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the ground of being filed out of time. Whether the Ombudsman erred in consolidating the three complaints and issuing a single dismissal order. Whether the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints on the ground of prescription. Whether the Ombudsman erred in concluding that the loans were not behest loans and that the complaints lacked allegations to that effect. Whether the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint against Golden River for its 1982 loan transactions.
Ruling
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Ombudsman are SET ASIDE, except with respect to the complaints relative to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982, and December 1, 1982. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct an evaluation on the respective merits of the remaining complaints.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of premature dismissal and lack of preliminary investigation: The Court held that under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. In such cases, a preliminary investigation is not mandatory, and the Ombudsman is not required to require counter-affidavits. However, a dismissal must be accompanied by a resolution stating the reasons for such dismissal, adhering to due process. On the issue of the timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: The Court found that the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was timely filed, as evidenced by a certification from the post office showing it was sent by registered mail on the last day of the reglementary period. The Ombudsman failed to controvert this evidence, thus the presumption of regularity was overcome, and the motion should be considered timely filed. On the issue of consolidation of complaints: The Court found no error in the Ombudsman's act of consolidating the three complaints and issuing a single order for dismissal, as the primary ground for dismissal for most complaints was prescription, a common issue. However, for orderly administration of justice, the Ombudsman was advised not to consolidate them upon remand, as different defenses and evidence would be involved. On the issue of prescription of offenses: The Court ruled that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints on the ground of prescription. Citing previous rulings, the Court held that for offenses under R.A. No. 3019, especially those involving connivance, the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the offense, not from the date of commission. The Committee was created on October 13, 1992, and the complaints were filed in 1996, thus the offenses had not yet prescribed. On the issue of behest loans and lack of allegations: The Court found it erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude that the complaints lacked allegations of behest loans. The complaints explicitly alleged that the loans were under-collateralized and the borrower corporations were undercapitalized, which are criteria for behest loans under Memorandum Order No. 61. The Ombudsman's dismissal order lacked a clear explanation of its findings regarding these allegations. On the dismissal of the complaint against Golden River for 1982 loan transactions: The Court found no error in the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint concerning the March 13, 1982, and December 1, 1982, loan transactions of Golden River. The Ombudsman's analysis showed that these loans were sufficiently collateralized in accordance with banking laws, and the Court found no cogent reason to deviate from this finding. However, the Ombudsman failed to discuss the refinancing loan obtained by Golden River in 1980, necessitating its remand for proper evaluation.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. No. 3019 should be computed from the discovery of the offense, not from the date of commission, especially when the nature of the offense involves connivance or conspiracy, making it difficult for the State to have known the violations at the time of commission. The Ombudsman erred in dismissing complaints solely on prescription without considering the discovery rule.