Decin v. Tayco
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainant Sevilla Decin, wife of the deceased Ernie Decin, filed a complaint for murder against several police officers, including SPO1 Melzasar Tayco, SPO1 Jeffrey Contrivida, SPO1 Sunny Becaro, SPO1 Gloria Gonzales, and PO3 Arlo Deonesa, along with SPO2 Jude dela Rama. The City Prosecutor found probable cause only against SPO2 Jude dela Rama for Murder, dismissing the complaint against the other respondents. This resolution was forwarded to and approved by the Ombudsman for Military. Procedural History: The complainant appealed the City Prosecutor's resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ). After a directive for submission of evidence was not fully complied with, the DOJ referred the appeal to the Ombudsman for Military. The Ombudsman denied the appeal, affirming the dismissal of charges against the respondents. Subsequently, an Information for Murder was filed against SPO2 Jude dela Rama before the Regional Trial Court. Later, the DOJ issued resolutions directing the filing of murder charges against the respondents, which were then questioned by the respondents before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA annulled the DOJ resolutions, reinstating the dismissal of charges against the respondents. The Petition: Petitioner Sevilla Decin filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA's decision that annulled the DOJ's resolutions. The petitioner argues that the CA committed errors in its findings of fact, denied her motion for reconsideration despite evidence, and erred in deciding questions of substance not in accordance with law or applicable Supreme Court decisions. The core issues raised concern the authority of the Cadiz City Prosecutor to endorse the resolution to the Ombudsman for Military and whether the Secretary of Justice is barred from re-asserting jurisdiction after the Ombudsman assumed control of the appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was within the prerogative, if not duty, of the Cadiz City Prosecutor to endorse for approval her resolution to the Ombudsman for Military despite the absence of basis/proof that the offense committed was in relation to office. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Secretary of Justice is barred from re-asserting his jurisdiction upon assumption by the Ombudsman for Military of the petitioner's appeal. Whether the Ombudsman has the inherent power to review the prosecutor's resolution.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the Ombudsman's Order, which approved the City Prosecutor's Resolution dismissing the complaint against the respondents, had become final and executory, and the DOJ could not subsequently modify or reverse it.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the City Prosecutor's prerogative to endorse to the Ombudsman: The Court affirmed the CA's finding that it was within the prerogative, if not the duty, of the City Prosecutor to endorse the resolution to the Ombudsman for Military for approval, especially since the offense of murder appeared to have been perpetrated by SPO2 Jude dela Rama in relation to his office. The subsequent approval by the Ombudsman for Military of the City Prosecutor's resolution, which exonerated the other respondents, and the denial of Decin's motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman, rendered the Ombudsman's ruling final and executory. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman's assumption of jurisdiction over the appeal, as a result of the DOJ's own indorsement, barred the DOJ from re-asserting its jurisdiction. The DOJ's attempt to modify the resolution was considered ultra vires and without legal basis. On the issue of the Secretary of Justice being barred from re-asserting jurisdiction: The Court held that the Ombudsman's assumption of jurisdiction over the appeal, stemming from the DOJ's own referral, effectively barred the DOJ from re-asserting its concurrent jurisdiction. The DOJ, by referring the appeal to the Ombudsman and allowing the latter to resolve the matter, lost its power to intervene. The Court found the DOJ's subsequent resolution to be an attempt to negate the Ombudsman's ruling, which was not conducive to the orderly administration of criminal justice. The fact that the Ombudsman's ruling became final and executory further solidified this bar. On the issue of the Ombudsman's power to review the prosecutor's resolution: The Court reiterated that the Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, and relevant jurisprudence recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigations. The OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 provides guidelines for this concurrent jurisdiction. The Court clarified that while the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage, once it takes cognizance of a case and its resolution becomes final and executory, other agencies like the DOJ are precluded from re-examining the same matter. The Ombudsman's role in reviewing and approving the prosecutor's resolution, especially when the offense is committed in relation to office, is a valid exercise of its constitutional mandate.
Main Doctrine
The Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. Once the Ombudsman takes cognizance of a case pursuant to its primary jurisdiction, it bars other agencies, such as the Department of Justice, from intervening in the preliminary investigation proceedings.