Dandoy v. Lopez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Erlinda Dandoy (Dandoy) purchased jewelry on credit from Nerissa Lopez on multiple occasions between November 1996 and October 1997, accumulating a debt of P310,000.00. Despite partial payments and promises to settle the outstanding balance, Dandoy failed to fully pay Lopez. Dandoy claimed she only intended to help Lopez sell the jewelry and attempted to return the items, which Lopez allegedly refused to accept. Lopez eventually filed a collection suit against Dandoy. Procedural History: Lopez initiated a civil case for a sum of money with preliminary attachment against Dandoy. After Lopez presented her evidence, Dandoy filed a Demurrer to Evidence, arguing that her obligation was not yet due and demandable as it was contingent on the sale of her property. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the demurrer, and subsequently denied Dandoy's motion for reconsideration. Dandoy then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking to nullify the RTC's orders. The CA dismissed Dandoy's petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the RTC. The CA also denied Dandoy's motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Dandoy, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She argues that the CA erred in not holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her demurrer to evidence. Dandoy also contends that the trial court should have dismissed the case based on her demurrer to evidence, that the trial court's order violated the Constitution by not stating the facts and law on which it was based, and that the Special Power of Attorney granted to her attorney-in-fact was sufficient to file the petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was sufficient to authorize the attorney-in-fact to file the Rule 45 petition. Whether the obligation to pay for the jewelry was an obligation with a period or a conditional obligation. Whether the trial court's order denying the demurrer to evidence violated the constitutional requirement to state findings of fact and law.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 25, 2001, and its Resolution dated September 19, 2001, are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Special Power of Attorney (SPA) granted to the attorney-in-fact was sufficient to authorize the filing of the petition for review. The language of the SPA authorized the attorney-in-fact to file a 'petition for certiorari and/or appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.' The use of 'and/or' indicates that either or both courses of action could be taken to prosecute the case. The intent of the petitioner to empower the representative until the termination of the case was unmistakable from the broad language used in the last clause of the SPA. Therefore, the authority was not limited to the Court of Appeals level but extended to subsequent proceedings in the Supreme Court. On Issue 2: The obligation to pay for the jewelry was a pure obligation, not an obligation with a period or a condition. Under Article 1193 of the New Civil Code, a 'day certain' is one that must necessarily come. The sale of the Bicutan property is not a day certain because it is an event that might never happen; thus, it is a condition, not a period. However, the Court found that the contract of sale was consummated upon the delivery of the jewelry, making the obligation demandable at once. The respondent's testimony showed she did not bind herself to wait exclusively for the sale of the property, as evidenced by the petitioner's own act of making a partial payment of P30,000.00 before any property was sold. On Issue 3: The RTC orders denying the demurrer to evidence did not violate Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. While the Constitution requires decisions to clearly state the facts and law, this requirement is applied most stringently to judgments and final orders that terminate a case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory in nature as it leaves something more to be done by the court. Furthermore, a cursory examination of the RTC's orders shows that the court sufficiently explained the basis for its ruling by stating that the plaintiff's evidence, standing alone, afforded a sufficient basis for judgment. The subsequent order denying reconsideration even quoted from the transcript of stenographic notes to justify its factual conclusions.
Main Doctrine
A demurrer to evidence may be denied even if the plaintiff's evidence, when considered in isolation, might suggest a condition for payment, if other evidence, when weighed as a whole, establishes a pure and demandable obligation. The sale of a property, which is not certain to happen, constitutes a condition, not a period, and if not imposed at the inception of the obligation, does not suspend its demandability.