Baylosis v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An Information was filed against petitioner Francisco L. Baylosis, Sr. for estafa before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. The Information alleged that from February 1990 to March 5, 1990, while employed as warehouse supervisor of Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Incorporated (PCPPI), Baylosis misappropriated P118,181.71 to the prejudice of the company. During arraignment, Baylosis pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded in absentia as he was out on bail and failed to appear. Prosecution witnesses Ricardo Tabasa and Leopoldo Abella testified that Baylosis confessed to taking money from company collections starting the last week of February 1990, resulting in a shortage of P90,000.00, which he claimed to have used for a "special project for following-up of land title." A subsequent cash count and physical inventory revealed a total shortage of P118,181.71, which Baylosis acknowledged and signed, adding the same notation. He failed to return the amount, leading to his preventive suspension, administrative investigation, dismissal from service, and notice of termination. Baylosis jumped bail, and his counsel manifested to submit the case for decision, resulting in Baylosis' waiver of his right to present evidence. Procedural History: The RTC of Cebu City, in a Decision dated January 10, 1992, found Baylosis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of seven (7) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify PCPPI in the amount of P118,181.71. The RTC denied his Motion for Reconsideration. Baylosis appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). Subsequently, Baylosis filed a Motion for New Trial with the CA, presenting an affidavit from Zenaida C. Aya-ay, PCPPI's Credit and Collection Manager, stating that his remaining balance owed to PCPPI was only P21,981.71. He prayed for a new trial and to change his plea to guilty. The CA, in a Resolution dated December 5, 2001, denied the Motion for New Trial for lack of merit. Baylosis' Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution dated February 8, 2002. The Petition: Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the CA Resolutions. The lone issue raised is whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion for New Trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion for New Trial, considering the alleged newly discovered evidence. Whether the affidavit of Zenaida C. Aya-ay, stating a reduced liability, constitutes newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial. Whether the principle of substantial justice, as invoked by the petitioner, justifies the grant of a new trial at this stage, and whether plea bargaining is a valid ground for a motion for new trial at this stage of the proceedings.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated December 5, 2001, and February 8, 2002, are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the denial of the Motion for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence: The Court held that for evidence to be considered newly discovered and warrant a new trial, it must satisfy four requisites: (1) discovered after trial; (2) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; (3) material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The affidavit of Zenaida C. Aya-ay, stating payments made by the petitioner on August 27, 1998, October 26, 1998, and November 6, 1998, was executed after the RTC rendered its January 10, 1992 Decision. Therefore, these payments could not have been discovered or produced during the trial. The Court emphasized that "discovery" implies gaining knowledge of something previously unknown or unrecognized. Since the alleged payments occurred after the judgment, they could hardly be classified as newly discovered evidence. The Court agreed with the CA's observation that the evidence presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence as it dealt with events that transpired after the trial court's judgment. On whether the affidavit constitutes newly discovered evidence: The Court reiterated its stance that the evidence presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence as it dealt with events that transpired after the trial court's judgment. On the invocation of substantial justice and plea bargaining: The petitioner argued that he did not rely on newly discovered evidence but on substantial justice, citing Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, and sought an opportunity for plea bargaining. He cited the case of Jose v. Court of Appeals to support his claim that a new trial could temper the severity of a judgment and prevent the failure of justice. However, the Court distinguished the present case from Jose. In Jose, the newly discovered evidence (a written permit and appointment as a PC agent) was crucial to establishing innocence and was genuinely unknown during the trial due to the need to protect the petitioner's identity as an undercover agent. The Court found the circumstances in Jose exceptional enough to warrant a new trial to afford the petitioner an opportunity to establish his innocence. In contrast, the petitioner in the present case brought forth the circumstance of his payment of the misappropriated amount several years after his conviction. The Court found this circumstance not extraordinary enough to warrant the grant of a new trial. Furthermore, the Court noted that plea bargaining as a ground for a motion for new trial comes too late at this stage of the proceedings. The Court reiterated that the purpose of a new trial is to allow the presentation of evidence that was newly discovered and could not have been presented earlier, not to facilitate plea bargaining after conviction based on events occurring post-judgment.
Main Doctrine
Payments made after the rendition of a judgment cannot be considered newly discovered evidence for the purpose of a motion for new trial, as such evidence must have been in existence and unknown to the party during the trial. Furthermore, plea bargaining is generally not a ground for a motion for new trial at a late stage of the proceedings.