De Castro v. Fernandez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On the evening of June 11, 2002, petitioner Reynaldo de Castro was invited to the barangay hall concerning a complaint for sexual assault filed by AAA on behalf of her daughter BBB. Petitioner was subsequently turned over to the police and later indorsed to the city prosecutor for inquest proceedings, resulting in a commitment order for his detention. An Information was filed against petitioner for rape, alleging that on or about June 11, 2002, with lewd designs, he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously committed acts of sexual assault with BBB, a seven-year-old minor, by touching and inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and consent. Procedural History: On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, praying for a preliminary investigation and an amendment of the charge to acts of lasciviousness, arguing that "fingering" is not covered under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353 (RA 8353). The trial court denied this motion in its August 5, 2002 Order. Petitioner's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied on August 28, 2002. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the August 5 and 28, 2002 Orders of the trial court.
Issue(s)
WHETHER A FINGER CONSTITUTES AN OBJECT OR INSTRUMENT IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8353; and on the propriety of the remedy availed. WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN FULL ACCORD WITH RULE 112 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the assailed Orders of the trial court.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether a finger constitutes an object or instrument under RA 8353: The Court found petitioner mistaken. Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, the insertion of one's finger into the vagina of another constitutes "rape through sexual assault." Therefore, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. On the propriety of the remedy: The Court declared that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A petition for certiorari lies only when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner failed to allege any such circumstance. Furthermore, following the hierarchy of courts, a special civil action for certiorari assailing an order of the Regional Trial Court should be filed with the Court of Appeals, not directly with the Supreme Court, absent any special reason or compelling circumstance. If treated as a petition for review under Rule 45, it would also fail because only judgments or final orders that completely dispose of the case can be the subject of such a petition; the assailed Orders were interlocutory. Petitioner should have proceeded with the trial and assailed the orders as part of an appeal from the final judgment. Additionally, petitioner failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 45 regarding submitted documents and timeliness. On the waiver of the right to preliminary investigation: The Court held that petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation. Under Section 7 of Rule 112, if an information is filed without a preliminary investigation, the accused may ask for one within five days from learning of its filing; failure to do so is deemed a waiver. The information was filed on June 18, 2002. Petitioner's counsel entered his appearance on June 25, 2002, yet the motion for reinvestigation was filed on July 1, 2002, which is more than five days from the time petitioner learned of the filing of the information. Therefore, petitioner waived his right.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail interlocutory orders of the Regional Trial Court; such issues should be raised on appeal from the final judgment. Furthermore, failure to request a preliminary investigation within five days from learning of the information's filing constitutes a waiver of the right to such investigation.