People v. Asejo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Erlinda Asejo and her husband were charged with estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The charge stemmed from an incident on May 6, 1998, where Erlinda Asejo allegedly received P100,000 from Vilma F. Castro. This amount was purportedly to be used as 'show money' for two months to demonstrate liquidity in their business, with a commitment to return it by July 18, 1998. The prosecution alleged that instead of returning the money, the Asejos misappropriated it for their personal use, despite repeated demands from Castro. 2. Procedural History: The case originated with the filing of the estafa complaint against Erlinda Asejo and her husband. Erlinda Asejo pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, found Erlinda Asejo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. This Supreme Court petition seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 3. The Petition: The petitioner, Erlinda Asejo, filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, arguing that the prosecution failed to present a formal demand letter, which she contends is a requisite for a conviction of estafa. Furthermore, she asserts that the transaction was a loan, not a trust agreement, because the Trust Undertaking did not specifically require the return of the identical money received, but merely the same amount.
Issue(s)
Whether formal demand is required to hold petitioner liable for estafa under Article 315 1(b). Whether the amount received was pursuant to a loan and not a trust agreement.
Ruling
The petition is without merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding petitioner Erlinda Asejo guilty of estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to thirteen (13) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered her to pay complainant PhP 100,000.00.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether formal demand is required to hold petitioner liable for estafa under Article 315 1(b): The Court held that demand under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code need not be formal or written. The law is silent on the form of demand, thus it should be interpreted in its general meaning, encompassing both written and oral demands. The failure to present a written demand is not fatal to the prosecution's case. In this case, both the petitioner and the private complainant admitted that a demand was made. The Court cited Tubb v. People, stating that demand is not a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement, as failure to account upon demand is merely circumstantial evidence of misappropriation, which can be established by other proofs. The testimonies of Castro and petitioner themselves confirmed that Castro went to demand the return of the money, and petitioner admitted that Castro demanded the return of the "down payment." On the issue of whether the amount received was pursuant to a loan and not a trust agreement: The Court ruled that the transaction was a trust agreement, not a loan. The elements of estafa under Article 315 1(b) were all present. Petitioner admitted receiving P100,000.00 in trust from Castro. The Trust Undertaking explicitly stated that the amount was received not as a loan or credit, and the purpose was to use it as "show money." The Court found it contrary to human experience not to require a document for a P100,000.00 down payment for a property. Furthermore, the property was mortgaged and sold at public auction shortly after the money was received, contradicting the petitioner's claim that it was a down payment for a sale. The nature of money being fungible, meaning the exact bills and coins cannot be returned, was already considered by the law in Article 315 1(b). The fiduciary nature of the obligation to account for the money received in trust was emphasized, distinguishing it from a contract of loan where the debtor acquires juridical possession and ownership. The parol evidence rule also prevented the petitioner from varying the terms of the written Trust Undertaking by claiming it was a contract of sale.
Main Doctrine
The elements of estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) receipt of money or property in trust or under an obligation to return the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion of such money or property, or denial of receipt; (3) prejudice to the offended party; and (4) demand made by the offended party. The nature of money, being fungible, does not preclude its receipt in trust, and a verbal demand is sufficient to establish the element of demand in estafa.